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Abstract
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem is the fundamental backbone of modern lattice based
cryptography, allowing one to establish cryptography on the hardness of well-studied computational
problems. However, schemes based on LWE are often impractical, so Ring LWE was introduced as a
form of ‘structured’ LWE, trading off a hard to quantify loss of security for an increase in efficiency by
working over a well chosen ring. Another popular variant, Module LWE, generalizes this exchange by
implementing a module structure over a ring. In this work, we introduce a novel variant of LWE over
cyclic algebras (CLWE) to replicate the addition of the ring structure taking LWE to Ring LWE by adding
cyclic structure to Module LWE. The proposed construction is both more efficient than Module LWE and
conjecturally more secure than Ring LWE, the best of both worlds. We show that the security reductions
expected for an LWE problem hold, namely a reduction from certain structured lattice problems to the
hardness of the decision variant of the CLWE problem. As a contribution of theoretic interest, we view
CLWE as the first variant of Ring LWE which supports non-commutative multiplication operations.
This ring structure compares favorably with Module LWE, and naturally allows a larger message space
for error correction coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the predicted advent of quantum computers compromising the bulk of existent crypto-
graphic constructions, lattice based cryptography has emerged as a promising foundation for long
term security. In particular, the Learning with Errors (henceforth LWE) problem introduced in
[1], as well as its variants over rings (RLWE) [2] and modules (MLWE) [3], provides a natural
intermediate step to base cryptographic hardness on lattice short vector problems in a post quan-
tum setting. Indeed, second round submissions to the NIST post quantum standardisation process
such as NewHope [4] and KYBER [5] rely on the hardness of LWE variants. Cryptography based
on the classical LWE problem is typically somewhat impractical, in part due to large key sizes.
To solve this, the ring variant was introduced as a way to provide extra structure in LWE to trade
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2a potential loss of security for an increase in efficiency. MLWE generalizes ring and classical
LWE, providing a smoother transition between security and efficiency than the binary option
presented by ring or classical LWE. The flexibility of MLWE is highly desirable in practice, as
demonstrated by third-round NIST finalists KYBER and SABER, both based on MLWE [6].
Conceptually, one may view all these problems as variations on a single problem. The (search)
LWE problem tasks a solver with recovering a secret vector s ∈ Znq from a collection of pairs
(ai, b = 〈ai, s〉+ei), where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product, each ai ∈ Znq is uniformly random and
the ei’s are small random errors. In practice, we view this collection of equations in matrix-vector
form:
As + e = b,
where all operations and entries are over Zq and the challenge is to recover s from A,b. A
popular ring variant replaces A, s, e with elements a, s, e from the ring Rq := Zq [x]xn+1 , requiring
the solver to obtain s from samples ai · s + ei. For power-of-two n this can be expressed in
matrix-vector form by considering the matrix rot(a), the negacyclic matrix obtained from the
coefficients of a. Explicitly, for a = a0 + a1x + ... + an−1xn−1 and bold faced letters denoting
coefficient vectors, a sample from the RLWE distribution takes the form:
a0 −an−1 . . . −a1
a1 a0 . . . −a2
...
... . . .
...
an−1 an−2 . . . a0
 s + e = b
where once again operations and entries are over Zq. This is exactly a structured version of
the classical LWE problem, where the uniformly random matrix A has been replaced by the
negacyclic matrix rot(a). Of course, this should be an easier problem to solve, yet no substantial
progress has been made in using the structure of rot(a) to solve the problem efficiently. We can
extend this matrix-vector view to MLWE as well. An MLWE instance takes place in a module
M of dimension d over Rq, such that a solver has to recover s ∈ M from a collection of pairs
(ai, 〈ai, s〉 + ei) where ai is a uniformly random element of M and each ei is a small random
element of Rq. A collection of such pairs can be viewed as As + e = b, where the ambient
space Zq has been replaced by Rq e.g. with d samples:
a1,1 a1,2 . . . a1,d
a2,1 a2,2 . . . a2,d
...
... . . .
...
ad,1 ad,2 . . . ad,d
 s + e = b
where all operations are over Rq and each ai,j is uniformly random. Of course, we could extend
this to have operations over Zq by applying the rot(·) operation coordinatewise, to obtain a
structured LWE instance in dimension nd.
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3An advantage of these structured matrices is that they allow for streamlined storage and
operations. For example, storing a uniformly random matrix A requires one to store all n2 of
its entries, but rot(a) requires a factor n less memory since one need only store its first column.
Equivalently, one RLWE sample generates n LWE samples while reducing the storage space and
key sizes. Multiplication can also be speeded up by using the Chinese Remaindering Theorem
(CRT) or other techniques.
This concept of improving efficiency by adding structure motivates this work; can we perform
an analog of the transformation taking an LWE matrix A to an RLWE matrix rot(a) for the
module M? We solve this by constructing a new variant of the LWE problem over a certain
non-commutative space known as a cyclic algebra. In recent years, cyclic algebras have received
significant attention in the field of coding theory (see e.g. [7], [8], [9]) due to the particular
nature of the matrix lattices they induce, and we view them as a suitable option for defining an
LWE problem over a non-commutative ring. Though some efforts have been made to construct
non-commutative LWE problems, for example [10], [11], the majority of non-commutative
cryptography has relied on group theoretic constructions, whose underlying hard problems are
often less robust than those of lattice cryptography. Somewhat informally, for a cyclic algebra
A and well chosen parameters there exists an automorphism θ of Rq and a γ ∈ Rq such that an
LWE style sample a · s+ e over A can be written in matrix-vector form
a0 γθ(ad−1) γθ2(ad−2) . . . γθd−1(a1)
a1 θ(a0) γθ
2(ad−1) . . . γθd−1(a2)
a2 θ(a1) θ
2(a0) . . . γθ
d−1(a3)
...
...
... . . .
...
ad−1 θ(ad−2) θ2(ad−3) . . . θd−1(a0)
 s + e = b
where all entries and operations are now over Rq. Though more complex than the transformation
taking LWE to RLWE this fulfills our goal of providing a structured version of MLWE, since
we have replaced the uniformly random matrix A over Rq with a structured matrix which we
denote φ(a) that requires a factor of d less storage. Of course, by applying the rot(·) operation
coordinatewise, one can extend this to a high dimensional version of the LWE problem, now
with two sets of structure lying on top of each other.
A. Contributions and Methodology
The main novel contribution of this work is a definition of Cyclic Algebra LWE (CLWE),
together with justifications for its construction and a polynomial time reduction from short vector
problems over matrix lattices induced by ideals in a cyclic algebra to CLWE, establishing its
security on the assumption that such problems are hard. As in [2], the algorithm bases the
security of CLWE on short vector problems over ideal lattices in A; similarly to ideal lattices in
K, these have some extra underlying structure that might make computational problems easier.
However, we leave the relative complexity of these problems an open area of investigation.
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4Overall we consider it plausible that LWE in cyclic algebras could be both more efficient than
MLWE and more secure than RLWE in a quantum setting. CLWE represents a middle ground
between RLWE and MLWE, with the salient feature of its non-commutative ring structure.
Cyclic algebra is equipped with a proper ring multiplication which preserves the dimension of
the lattice. This is in sharp contrast to MLWE which only supports scalar multiplication and to
RLWE whose multiplication is commutative. Specifically, we consider the following advantages
of our CLWE construction:
• Efficiency. CLWE can be seen a structured variant of MLWE. Assuming for simplicity
that the public key in LWE based schemes is a sample (A,b), a public key generated as
A = rot(φ(a)) requires only as much storage as that of an equivalent dimension RLWE
public key1. Multiplication in cyclic algebras can be implemented over a product of skew
polynomial rings following a CRT-style decomposition (see Appendix G), for which well
known fast algorithms, such as those of [13] and [14], can applied to compute the operation
A·s more efficiently in the case where A = φ(a) than in the module case where A is uniform.
• Security. Following recent works on quantum attacks on related ideal lattice problems (e.g.
[15],[16], [17], [18] amongst others), we observe that the non-commutativity of multiplica-
tion in cyclic algebras may be viewed as a security advantage. This is because the Hidden
Subgroup Problem (HSP), an integral part of the majority of algorithms using quantum
computing to gain an advantage over classical computation, requires that the underlying
group, in this case the unit group of OK , is commutative, see e.g. [19], which is untrue
for a non-commutative algebra. We conjecture that the security level is higher than RLWE,
but welcome further cryptanalysis. We actively avoid known attacks on previous attempts
to create structured MLWE (see Section III-B).
• Decryption failure rates. The scalar multiplication of MLWE is dimension-lossy. In other
words, the message space of MLWE is restricted in Rq, whose dimension is smaller than
that of the module lattice. It leaves less room for error correction coding in MLWE-based
schemes (e.g., a KYBER instance for a key size of 256 within Rq of dimension 256). This
limitation of MLWE appears to be fundamental, due to its module structure. In contrast, the
dimension of the message space of CLWE is that of the (non-commutative) ring, which
is higher by a factor of d. Thus, it accommodates better error correction coding (see
Section V-B), and low decryption failure rates are desired under chosen ciphertext attacks
(CCA). Even trivial repetition coding can dramatically reduce decryption failure rates (e.g.,
NewHope).
• Functionality. We view the ring structure of CLWE as a major advantage over MLWE, which
opens up the prospect of extra functionality. For example, since operations are composable
1In practice, a seed is often used to generate the matrix A, which however requires a pseudorandom generator under the
random oracle model. By contrast, CLWE does not require the random oracle model. Moreover, certain applications do not
permit the use of a seed, e.g., pseudorandom functions [12].
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5and non-commutative, one could hope to construct FHE in this non-commutative ring. We
leave this frontier open for separate work.
B. Related Work and Organization
This work is related to a number of different areas: lattice-based cryptography, information
theory and number theory.
In lattice-based cryptography, an alternative construction for structured module LWE, called
multivariate-RLWE, was presented in [20], [21], where they tensor product two (or more) number
fields in order to provide a structured module matrix. However, an efficient implementation of
[20] was attacked in [22], together with a warning about taking care when putting structure
on a module. In short, [22] attacks certain instances of multivariate-RLWE by providing a
homomorphism to some underlying subfield K, dramatically reducing the dimension of the
lattice problem to be attacked. Fortunately for this work, a somewhat technical condition on the
choice of γ known as the non-norm condition precludes such a homomorphism existing to reduce
the dimension of CLWE (see Section III-B). It is worth pointing out that that their problem has
been addressed in [21], and in fact this fix looks somewhat like our non-norm condition (e.g.,
unlike the original version, full rank is maintained in [21]).
This paper is inspired by the abundant literature of space-time coding based on cyclic division
algebras (see the monographs [8], [23] and references therein). On a high level, our construction is
reminiscent of multi-block space-time codes [24], [25], rather than single-block codes [26], [27],
with the caveat of scaling up the number of blocks to make the codes practically undecodable. In
the context of space-time coding, our construction generalizes [25] and offers greater flexibility
in the code parameters (the number of blocks vs. the number of antennas). Multi-block space-
time codes have been used in [9] to achieve information-theoretic security over wiretap channels,
as opposed to computational security in a classic cryptographic setting of this paper. Maximal
orders were shown in [28], [7] as advantageous to the so-called natural orders; both types of
orders play a crucial role in this paper. There is a major difference between the roles of cyclic
algebras in coding and cryptography, though: the primary concern for coding is the non-vanishing
determinant (NVD), while the non-commutative ring structure becomes crucial for cryptography.
For efficient multiplication of elements in a cyclic algebra, we heavily rely on the CRT technique
of [29]; a similar technique has been used in lattice index codes [30], [31].
We present two approaches (subfields and compositum fields) to the construction of novel
cyclic division algebras, which enlarge the pool of algebras and may find other applications.
Specifically, our proof that the natural order of the family of cyclic division algebras constructed
in Section III-C1 (including those in [25]) is in fact maximal, is an original contribution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide necessary background
material on lattices, number fields, and cyclic algebras. In Section III we provide a definition
and discussion of CLWE, together with novel constructions of cyclic division algebras for the
CLWE problem. In Section IV we provide a reduction from structured lattice problems to search
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6CLWE, as well as a search-worst case decision reduction for CLWE. In Section V we show a
sample CLWE cryptosystem and provide an estimate of its asymptotic operation complexity.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI with a discussion of open problems. For a smooth
flow of the main text, certain proofs, sideline discussions and technical details are deferred to
appendices.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Lattices
A lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of a vector space V . If V has dimension n a lattice
L can be viewed as the set of all integer linear combinations of a set of linearly independent
vectors B = {b1, ...,bk} for some k ≤ n, written L = L(B) = {
∑k
i=1 zibi : zi ∈ Z}. If k = n
we call the lattice full-rank, and we will only consider lattices of full-rank. We can extend this
notion of lattices to matrix spaces by stacking the columns of a matrix. We recall two standard
lattice definitions.
Definition 1. Given a lattice L in a space V endowed with a metric ‖ · ‖, the minimum distance
of L is defined as λ1(L) = minv∈Λ/{0} ‖v‖. Similarly, λn(L) is the minimum length of a set of
n linearly independent vectors, where the length of a set of vectors {x1, ..., xn} is defined as
maxi(‖xi‖).
Definition 2. Given a lattice L ⊂ V , where V is endowed with an inner product 〈·, ·〉, the dual
lattice L∗ is defined L∗ = {v ∈ V : 〈L, v〉 ⊂ Z}.
B. Gaussian Distributions
Definition 3. For a vector space V with norm ‖ · ‖ and an r > 0, we define the Gaussian
function ρr : V → (0, 1] by ρr(x) = exp(−pi‖x‖/r2).
We can use this function to define the spherical Gaussian distribution Dr over V , which
outputs v with probability proportional to ρr(v). Similarly, we can sample an elliptical Gaussian
Dr in a basis b1, ...,bn of V , for r = (r1, ..., rn) a vector of positive reals, by sampling x1, ..., xn
independently from the one dimensional Gaussian distributions Dri and outputting
∑n
i=1 xibi.
When sampling a Gaussian over a lattice L we will use the discrete form of the Gaussian
distribution. We define the distribution DΛ,r over Λ by outputting x with probability ρr(x)ρr(L) for
each x ∈ L. This version of the discrete Gaussian is centered at 0, which in general need not
be the case.
An important lattice quantity, known as the smoothing parameter, was introduced in [32]. The
motivation for the name is provided by Lemma 1 following the definition.
Definition 4. For a lattice L and ε > 0, the smoothing parameter ηε(L) is defined as the smallest
r > 0 satisfying ρ1/r(L∗/{0}) ≤ ε.
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Lemma 1. For a lattice L over Rn, ε > 0, r ≥ ηε(L), and x ∈ Rn, the statistical distance
between (Dr + x) mod L and the uniform distribution modulo L is bounded above by ε/2.
Equivalently, ρr(L+ x) ∈ [1−ε1+ε , 1] · ρr(L).
We introduce well known lemmas used to relate the smoothing parameter to standard lattice
properties. The first comes from [33], the second from [34].
Lemma 2. For a lattice L of dimension n and c ≥ 1 it holds that c√n/λ1(L∗) ≥ ηε(L) for
ε = exp(−c2n).
Lemma 3. For a lattice L and ε ∈ (0, 1) it holds that ηε(L) ≥
√
log(1/ε)/pi
λ1(L∗) .
C. Algebraic Number Theory
Definition 5. A number field K is a finite degree extension of the rationals Q. Typically, we
define a number field by adjoining some algebraic element α ∈ C and set K = Q(α). The
degree of K refers to its degree as a field extension.
To define a cyclic algebra, we will need to take an additional extension of K. In particular,
we will need the extension to be Galois over K, defined as follows.
Definition 6. Let L/K be an extension of number fields of dimension d. The Galois group of L
over K is the group Aut(L/K) of automorphisms of L that fix K. We say that the extension is
Galois if the subfield of L fixed by Aut(L/K) is exactly K.
We define a cyclic Galois extension L/K to be a Galois extension such that the Galois group
of L over K is the cyclic group generated by some element θ of degree d := [L : K]. Finally,
we require the ring of integers of a number field.
Definition 7. Given a number field K, its ring of integers OK is the ring consisting of those
elements of K whose minimal polynomial over Q lie in Z[x].
It is easy to check that if L/K is an extension of number fields then OL ∩K = OK .
1) The Canonical Embedding: Let K = Q(α) be a number field of degree n. It is a well
known fact that there are exactly n distinct ring embeddings σi : K → C. These embeddings
correspond to the n distinct injective ring homomorphisms mapping α to the roots of its minimum
polynomial f . We split these embeddings and say that there are r1 real embeddings (whose image
lie in R) and r2 conjugate pairs of complex embeddings (the complex embeddings come in pairs
since complex roots of f occur in conjugate pairs), such that r1 + 2r2 = n. The standard
convention is to order the embeddings such that the r1 real embeddings come first and the
complex embeddings are arranged such that σr1+j = σr1+r2+j for 1 ≤ j ≤ r2.
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8Definition 8. Let K = Q(α) be a number field of degree n = r1 +2r2. The canonical embedding
σ is the ring homomorphism σ : K → Rr1 × C2r2 defined by
σ(x) = (σ1(x), ..., σn(x)).
Formally, σ maps into the space
H = {(x1, ..., xn) ∈ Rr1 × C2r2 |xr1+r2+j = xr1+j ∀1 ≤ j ≤ r2} ⊂ Cn,
which is isomorphic to Rn as an inner product space.
We can equip H with the orthonormal basis {hi}, where hi = ei for 1 ≤ i ≤ r1 and
hj = 1√2(ej + ej+r2),hj+r2 =
√−1√
2
(ej − ej+r2) for r1 < j ≤ r1 + r2, and use the well defined
`p norm induced by viewing H as a subset of Cn. Observe that multiplication in K maps
to coordinatewise multiplication in H . The `2 norm on H allows us to efficiently sample a
Gaussian distribution Dr over K by sampling such a Gaussian coordinatewise over H , although
technically this distribution is over the field tensor product KR = K ⊗QR ∼= H . Furthermore, it
satisfies the property that for any x ∈ KR we have the equality of distributions x ·Dr and Dr′ ,
where r′i = ri · |σi(x)|. When we have an extension of number fields L/K we will denote their
respective canonical embeddings σL and σK as maps into HL and HK to avoid confusion.
2) Relative Embeddings: In the case of an extension L of a number field K it is sometimes
more convenient to apply a different order on its embeddings induced by extending embeddings
of K to those of L. Given a tower L/K/Q where K has degree n and L has degree d over K,
there are precisely n embeddings σ1, ..., σn of K into C. Assuming L/Q is Galois, each of these
can be extended to an embedding αi : L → L such that αi|K = σi. However, these extensions
are not unique, and it is easy to see that there are [L : K] = d choices for each αi. In particular,
in the case where L/K is a cyclic extension with Galois group generated by θ it holds that
the composite automorphisms αi ◦ θj(·), 1 ≤ j ≤ d, run through the d choices of αi. Hence for
a fixed choice of α1, ..., αn the nd automorphisms of L can each be uniquely represented by
some αi ◦ θj(·), which we denote by αji (·), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ d. Given the usual ordering
of embeddings of K this induces two systematic orderings on the embeddings of L by running
through either the i or j coordinates first.
D. Cyclic Algebras
Definition 9. Let K be a number field with degree n, and let L be a Galois extension of K of
degree d such that the Galois group of L over K is cyclic of degree d, Gal(L/K) = 〈θ〉. For
non-zero γ ∈ K we define the resulting cyclic algebra
A = (L/K, θ, γ) := L⊕ uL⊕ ...⊕ ud−1L
where ⊕ denotes the direct sum, u ∈ A is some auxiliary generating element of A satisfying the
additional relations xu = uθ(x),∀x ∈ L and ud = γ. We will call d the degree of the algebra
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9A. We call such an algebra a division algebra if every element a ∈ A has an inverse a−1 ∈ A
such that aa−1 = 1.
The relations among K, L and A are illustrated in Fig. 1.
𝐾 𝐿 𝒜
Cyclic Extension Attach 𝑢
Degree 𝑑 Degree 𝑑
Fig. 1: Structure of a cyclic algebra.
Since θ fixes K, the center of the cyclic algebra is precisely K. Oftentimes the condition
γ ∈ K is replaced by the stronger condition γ ∈ OK , and we will use this condition in our work
to guarantee the existence of a certain subring known as the natural order. Note that the division
property does not hold for arbitrary γ, and such algebras are not always easy to construct, which
we will discuss later in this section.
We present a matrix representation of elements of A which proves useful for computing
multiplication in cyclic algebras. We can naturally view an element a ∈ A as an d-dimensional
vector Vec(a) over L, in which case we can view left multiplication of elements as matrix-vector
operations. This is done by defining the map φ : A →Md×d(L), where for x = x0 + ux1 + ...+
ud−1xd−1 ∈ A with each xi ∈ L,
φ(x) =

x0 γθ(xd−1) γθ2(xd−2) . . . γθd−1(x1)
x1 θ(x0) γθ
2(xd−1) . . . γθd−1(x2)
x2 θ(x1) θ
2(x0) . . . γθ
d−1(x3)
...
...
... . . .
...
xd−1 θ(xd−2) θ2(xd−3) . . . θd−1(x0)
 .
We call this mapping a left regular representation of A, because it holds for any a, b ∈ A that
φ(a)Vec(b) = Vec(ab), and that φ(ab) = φ(a) ·φ(b). In the case where A is a division algebra it
follows that each φ(a) is an invertible matrix. Since θ is well defined on LR we abuse notation
and extend this map to φ :
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR → Md×d(LR). We derive lattices from subrings of a
cyclic algebra by vectorising their images under φ.
Definition 10. Let A = (L/K, θ, γ) be a cyclic division algebra. A Z-order Λ in A is a finitely
generated Z-module such that Λ · Q = A and that Λ is a subring of A with the same identity
element as A. We call Λ maximal if there is no Z-order Γ such that Λ ( Γ ( A. Here,
Λ ·Q = {∑mi=1 aiqi : ai ∈ Λ, qi ∈ Q,m ∈ Z≥1}.
Since we are only concerned with Z-orders in this paper, we will just refer to them as orders.
Example 1. The ring of integers OK of a number field K is the unique maximal order of a
number field. In the case of cyclic algebras a maximal order is not necessarily unique.
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An order of particular interest that we will use in our LWE construction is known as the
natural order, defined as Λ :=
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iOL. Unlike in the case of OK , this order is not necessarily
maximal (however, we are going to work with natural orders that are also maximal). Note that
in order for Λ to be closed under multiplication the element γ must lie in OK .
1) Non-Norm Condition: It is not a priori obvious whether well-defined cyclic algebras or
orders actually exist. As observed earlier, the existence of γ enforcing the division algebra
condition is a key component in constructing such objects. Fortunately, it is sufficient for γ to
satisfy the so called ‘non-norm condition’ [7].
Proposition 1. The cyclic algebra A = (L/K, θ, γ) of degree d is a division algebra if and
only if none of the elements γt, 1 ≤ t ≤ d− 1, appears in NL/K(L), where NL/K represents the
relative norm of L into K.
In other words, this condition states that the lowest power of γ that is norm of some element
of L, is γd.
2) Order Ideals: Analogous to the use of OK ideals in RLWE, we will be interested in ideals
of an order Λ of a cyclic division algebra A. Although Λ is a ring, it is non-commutative - thus
there are three types of ideals. A left (respectively right) ideal I of Λ is an additive subgroup
of Λ such that for any i ∈ I, r ∈ Λ, we have r · i ∈ I (respectively i · r ∈ I). A two-sided
ideal of Λ is an additive subgroup that is closed under left and right scaling by Λ, i.e. a right
ideal that is also a left ideal. The sum and product of two ideals I,J are defined as usual;
I + J = {i + j : i ∈ I, j ∈ J } and I · J = {∑ml=1 il · jl : il ∈ I, jl ∈ J ,m ∈ N}. In the case
of two-sided ideals we have the standard notion of a fractional ideal; I is a fractional ideal of
Λ if cI = J for a two-sided ideal J and some c ∈ K. In the rest of this paper, a (fractional or
integral) ideal is always restricted to be two-sided, unless otherwise stated.
We remark that the structure of the collection of two-sided ideals of the natural order is not as
simple as those of OK , or indeed those of an arbitrary maximal order. In a maximal order, the
group of two-sided ideals is a free abelian group generated by the prime (e.g. maximal) ideals
[35, Theorem 22.10], from which one can deduce obvious definitions of inverse and coprime
ideals. For a general order Λ, we define its prime ideals as its maximal two-sided ideals and the
inverse of an ideal I ⊂ Λ is
I−1 = {x ∈ A : I · x · I ⊂ I},
which lines up with the expected definition in the two-sided case (e.g. I · I−1 = I−1 · I = Λ).
For the case of the natural order we do not have such a well-behaved ideal group, but a nice
exposition is given in [29, Section 3]. In particular, for a two-sided ideal I ⊂ Λ, I ∩ OK is
an ideal of OK . For an ideal I ⊂ OK , (I · Λ) ∩ OK = I, from which it follows that this
intersection map is a surjection onto the ideals of OK . However, it is not in general an injection
since several ideals of A may have the same intersection with OK . Since the ideals of Λ do
not in general form a finitely generated abelian group, we define two ideals I,J of Λ to be
coprime if I + J = Λ.
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Nonetheless, since the orders to be constructed in Section III-C1 are both natural and maximal,
it will always hold for a two-sided ideal I that I · I−1 = I−1 · I = Λ and (I−1)−1 = Λ. These
properties will be required in the proofs of Lemmas 6 and 7.
3) Some Useful Ideals: For an order Λ we define the codifferent ideal
Λ∨ = {x ∈ A : Tr(xΛ) ⊂ Z}
where Tr refers to the reduced trace, defined Tr(a) := TrK/Q(Trace(φ(a))). Similarly, for an
ideal I we define the dual ideal
I∨ = {x ∈ A : Tr(xI) ⊂ Z}.
Since the matrix trace satisfies Trace(AB) = Trace(BA), this definition is two-sided. Note that
the codifferent ideal and a general dual ideal may be fractional ideals rather than full ideals, and
they satisfy the equality I∨ = Λ∨ · I−1 for any ideal I.
We will also be interested in principal ideals, but must take more care with these than in
commutative settings. For a central element t ∈ K, we can define simply 〈t〉 = t · Λ, the set of
elements of Λ divisible by t. However, for a general t that does not lie in the center of Λ we
need the slightly more complex definition
〈t〉 =
{
m∑
i=1
ritsi : ri, si ∈ Λ,m ∈ N
}
,
which can easily be seen to be a two-sided ideal, moreover the smallest one that contains t.
4) Orders and Ideals as Integer Lattices: Any order Λ of a cyclic algebra A = (L/K, θ, γ)
has dimension nd2 over Z and thus generates a lattice of dimension nd2 over Z. We will consider
the following representation of these lattices, which extends naturally to ideals of orders as well.
Consider an element x =
⊕d−1
i=0 u
ixi ∈ Λ. We can consider x as a vector over HL of dimension
d by σA(x) := {σL(x0), σL(x1), ..., σL(xd−1)}. Then, the collection σA(Λ) forms an integer
lattice of dimension nd2. We will refer to this representation as the “module representation”
and will sometimes double index the element x, denoting by xi,j the embedding σj(xi), and
extend this notation in the obvious manner to the space
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR. Though this representation
is conceptually simple, we remark that it has some drawbacks in the case where |σi(γ)| 6= 1 for
some i when considering sizes of lattice elements; we will choose γ carefully in our constructions
to remove this issue.
5) Gaussian Distributions Over Cyclic Algebras: As in (R)LWE, we will need to sample
Gaussian distributions over our ambient space in certain norms. In the case of RLWE, the
continuous Gaussians are sampled in KR ∼= H . Since a cyclic algebra A can be viewed as an
n-dimensional algebra over L, we use the visualization from the previous subsection and sample
our error distributions over
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR, which has the same structure as a vector space as HLd.
For simplicity we restrict ourselves to the case when |σi(γ)| = 1 for each i. Although this is
a strong condition on γ it holds in the case where it is a root of unity, which we will enforce
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later. Otherwise, in order to maintain a norm that is sub-multiplicative the norm and shape of γ
must be considered.
Explicitly, we just consider the norm of an element of A to be equal to the norm of the corre-
sponding module element in Ld of dimension nd2 used in [3], e.g. ‖x‖ = ‖(σL(x0), σL(x1), ..., σL(xd−1))‖2
for x = x0 + ux1 + ...+ ud−1xd−1 ∈ A. It is straightforward to check that this is indeed a norm
in the case where |σi(γ)| = 1 for each i, since γ is fixed under θ and multiplying by γ does not
change the norm of an entry of σL. It is clear that this norm extends to any y ∈
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR in
a natural manner. Now that we have defined a norm, it is easy to define a Gaussian distribution
Dr on A, or its discrete analogue on Λ by sampling over the module LRd.
6) The CRT: In this subsection we state the CRT for order ideals, and deduce some important
consequences. We note that the following lemmas are merely adaptations of those in [2, Section
2.3.8] extended to the case of cyclic algebras. The first is just the CRT.
Lemma 4. Let I1, ..., Ir be pairwise coprime ideals of an order Λ of a cyclic algebra A, and
let I = ∏ri=1 Ii. Then, the natural map Λ → ⊕ri=1(Λ/Ii) induces an isomorphism Λ/I →⊕r
i=1(Λ/Ii).
We call a CRT basis for a set of coprime order ideals I1, ..., Ir a basis C = {c1, ..., cr} of
elements of Λ satisfying ci = 1 mod Ii, ci = 0 mod Ij for i 6= j.
Lemma 5. Given pairwise coprime ideals I1, ..., Ir of an order Λ, there is a deterministic
polynomial time algorithm that outputs a CRT basis c1, ..., cr ∈ Λ for those ideals.
The proof is the same as in the ring case [2, Lemma 2.13]. Using Lemma 5 we can efficiently
invert the natural CRT isomorphism. Given a = (a1, ..., ar) ∈
⊕r
i=1(Λ/Ii), it can be easily
checked that its inverse is b =
∑r
i=1 aici mod I.
The next two lemmas will be required later to construct an efficiently invertible bijection
between quotient spaces I/〈q〉 · I and Λ/〈q〉.
Lemma 6. Assuming q is unramified in L. Let I be an ideal of the natural order Λ which
is maximal and let J = q · Λ = 〈q〉 · Λ, where q is a prime integer and 〈q〉 = ∏ri=1 qi is a
decomposition into prime ideals in OK . Assume γ /∈ qi for each i. Then, there exists an element
t ∈ I ∩ OK such that the ideal t · I−1 ⊂ Λ is coprime to J , and we can compute such a t
efficiently given I and the prime factorization of J .
Remark 1. The condition on γ will be immaterial in our use case, since when γ is a unit the
only OK ideal that contains γ is OK itself.
Proof. For an ideal I denote by I its intersection with K, which is a non-trivial ideal of OK
(see [29, Section 3]). We apply the corresponding [2, Lemma 2.14] to obtain t ∈ I such that
t · I−1 and J are coprime as ideals of OK and t ∈ I \
⋃r
i=1 qi · I. Assume, for a contradiction,
that t · I−1 + J 6= Λ e.g. the ideals are not coprime. Then, there is some maximal ideal M of
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Λ containing t · I−1 and J . Since q is unramified in L and γ /∈ qi, by [29, Propositions 1 and
4], this ideal must be one of the ideals qi · Λ since it contains J . Then t · I−1 ⊂ qi · Λ and
consequentially t ∈ qi · I because I · I−1 = Λ in a maximal order. Since t and qi are central it
follows that t ∈ qi · I, a contradiction.
The next lemma will be the one we use in our reduction. As in RLWE, in practice we are
interested in the case where J = 〈q〉 for a prime integer q and P = Λ∨. We will use the familiar
notation Iq := I/q · I for an ideal I and q ∈ Z throughout the paper.
Lemma 7. Let Λ, γ and q be given in Lemma 6. Let I,J be ideals of Λ, with t ∈ I ∩ OK
chosen as above such that t · I−1 and J are coprime as ideals, and let P denote an arbitrary
fractional ideal of Λ. Then, the function χt : A → A defined as χt(x) = t · x induces a module
isomorphism from P/J · P → I · P/I · J · P . Furthermore, in the case J = 〈q〉 for a prime
integer q we can efficiently compute the inverse.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of [2]. Since t lies in the center of Λ it is clear that
multiplication by t induces a module homomorphism. Given the map χt : P → I·P/I ·J ·P and
j ∈ J ·P , χt(j) = t·j ∈ I ·J ·P , so it is clear that J ·P is in the kernel of this map. Conversely,
if χt(x) = 0 then t · x ∈ I · J · P , from which it follows that I−1 · t · x ⊂ J · P . From the
definition of coprime, t · I−1 +J = Λ, from which it follows that there exists a ∈ t · I−1, b ∈ J
such that a + b = 1. Hence x = (a + b) · x = a · x + b · x. Since a · x, b · x ∈ J · P it follows
that x ∈ J · P , from which injectivity follows immediately.
To demonstrate efficient invertibility, we must work slightly harder. Now let J = 〈q〉. Compute
t as in Lemma 6 and observe that the bijection χt : Λq → Iq is an additive homomorphism.
Thus, it suffices to compute the inverse of all elements of a Z basis of Iq, since then any element
can be inverted by computing its representation in this basis and inverting that. We construct
such a basis as follows. First, choose n2 · d4 elements xi, i = 1, ..., n2 · d4 from Λq uniformly
at random and compute yi = χt(xi) for each i. It follows that each yi is a uniformly random
element of Iq. Then, with high probability the yi’s form a spanning set of Iq (see the proceeding
lemma), which we can reduce to a Z basis y′1, ..., y′n·d2 . This basis satisfies the desired property
that each element has a known inverse. If this algorithm fails (e.g. there is no suitable basis
y′1, ...y
′
n·d2), we repeat, choosing a fresh set of elements x1, ..., xn2·d4 until we succeed.
Lemma 8. Given a set of n2 · d4 independent and uniformly random elements Ξ ⊂ Zn·d2q , the
probability that Ξ contains no set of n ·d2 linearly independent vectors (over Z) is exponentially
small in d.
This lemma is a straightforward adaptation of Corollary 3.16 of [1].
E. Lattice Problems
Computational problems on lattices represent the foundations of the security of (R)LWE, and
will do so for our Cyclic LWE as well. The standard lattice problems are as follows.
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Definition 11. Let ‖·‖ be some norm on Rn and let ξ ≥ 1. Then the approximate Shortest Vector
Problem (SVPξ) on input a lattice L is to find some non-zero vector x such that ‖x‖ ≤ ξ ·λ1(L).
Definition 12. Let ‖ · ‖ be some norm on Rn and let ξ ≥ 1. Then the (approximate) Shortest
Independent Vectors Problem (SIVPξ) on input a lattice L is to find n linearly independent
non-zero vectors x1, ..., xn such that maxi(‖xi‖) ≤ ξ · λn(L).
Definition 13. Let ‖ · ‖ be some norm on Rn, let L be a lattice, and let d < λ1(L)/2. Then the
Bounded Distance Decoding problem (BDDL,d) on input y = x+ e for x ∈ L and ‖e‖ ≤ d is to
compute x, or equivalently e.
The above problems are all well investigated, and believed to be sufficiently hard to base post-
quantum cryptographic security on; there are no known algorithms for any of these problems
(for suitable parameters) running in polynomial time in dimension n.
Unfortunately, these problems are not directly suitable for CLWE, where we will be interested
in their adaptations to lattices generated by order ideals, similarly to how ideal lattices are used
the ring case. Specifically we have the same problems on lattices that they induce under the map
σA(·). So, SVP becomes:
Definition 14. Let A be a cyclic algebra, let I be some (possibly fractional) ideal of the natural
order Λ. Then, for an approximation factor ξ ≥ 1, the A-SVPξ is to find a non-zero element
a ∈ I such that |a| := ‖σA(a)‖2 ≤ ξ · λ1(I), where as usual λ1(I) denotes the minimal length
of elements of I in the given norm.
Remark 2. When we use these problems in our security reductions, we will assume that the
ideals are in fact integral ideals (e.g. we exclude fractional ideals). Observe that this may be
done without loss of generality, since solving the A-SVP problem on the fractional ideal I may
be done by solving it on the integral ideal cI (where c ∈ K is the element such that cI is
integral) and rescaling the solution.
Essentially we have a specialized version of the SVP problem; we must find an element of
I with minimal norm (up to approximation factor) in the ideal I. The extension of SIVP to
A-SIVP is analogous, but since we consider our objects as Z-lattices we require the independent
‘vectors’ a1, ..., ar to be linearly independent over Z. For BDD, we need a suitable ambient
space, and use the following definition.
Definition 15. Let A be a cyclic algebra, let I be some (possibly fractional) ideal of a maximal
Z-order Λ, and let δ < λ1(I)/2. Then the A-BDDI,δ problem, on input y = x + e for x ∈ I
and e ∈⊕d−1i=0 uiLR satisfying |e| ≤ δ, is to compute x.
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F. The Learning With Errors Problem
We will briefly recall the initial Learning With Errors (LWE) problem here; in Section III we
will extend it to cyclic algebras. The problem comes in two forms; search and decision, both
of which are based on the LWE distribution. Let n and q be positive integers, and let α > 0 be
some error parameter. Define T := R/Z, the unit torus.
Definition 16. For a secret s ∈ Znq , a sample (a, b) ← As,α is taken by sampling a uniformly
random vector a ∈ Znq and e← Dα and outputting (a, b) = (a, 〈a, s〉/q + e mod Z).
Given the above distribution, the LWE problem comes in two forms.
Definition 17. The search LWE problem is to recover s from a collection of samples As,α. The
decision LWE problem on input a collection of samples on Znq ×T is to decide whether they are
uniform samples or were taken from As,α for some secret s, providing the samples were taken
from one of these distributions.
Typically, the number of samples provided in each of these problems depends on the ap-
plication. Since the decision problems has a probabilistic element, we will be interested in
the advantage of the algorithms that solve it, which is defined as the difference between their
acceptance probabilities on samples from an LWE distribution As,α and the uniform distribution.
In practice, the decision problem is of more interest in cryptography.
We will not define the popular extensions of these problems to number fields or modules,
known as Ring-LWE and Module-LWE, but the unfamiliar reader may find details in [2] and
[3] respectively, both of which we reference frequently in this work.
III. THE CLWE PROBLEM
In this section we present the general definition of CLWE together with justifications for
choices made in the definition, as well as constructions of specific algebras to use. We will save
the security properties for Section IV-A.
Definition 18. Let L/K be a Galois extension of number fields of dimension [L : K] = d,
[K : Q] = n with cyclic Galois group generated by θ(·). Let A := (L/K, θ, γ) be the resulting
cyclic algebra with center K and invariant u with ud = γ ∈ OK . Let Λ be an order of A. For
an error distribution ψ over
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR, an integer modulus q ≥ 2, and a secret s ∈ Λ∨q , a
sample from the CLWE distribution Πq,s,ψ is obtained by sampling a← Λq uniformly at random,
e← ψ, and outputting (a, b) = (a, (a · s)/q + e mod Λ∨) ∈ (Λq,
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR)/Λ
∨.
Remark 3. Unlike in commutative spaces, the order of multiplication of a and s is important;
our choice is (a · s), but similar security properties would hold if one took (s · a) instead. Also
observe that our modulo reduction in the second coordinate of the pair is well defined, since
(a · s) ∈ Λ∨q .
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As usual, the associated CLWE problem will come in search and decision variants.
Definition 19. Let Πq,s,ψ be a CLWE distribution for parameters q ≥ 2, s ∈ Λ∨q , and error
distribution ψ. Then, the search CLWE problem, which we denote by CLWEq,s,ψ, is to recover
s ∈ Λ∨q from a collection of independent samples from Πq,s,ψ.
We do not state the number of samples allowed for this (or the next) problem, as typically it
depends on the application.
Definition 20. Let Υ be some distribution on a family of error distributions over
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR
and UΛ denote the uniform distribution on (Λq, (
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR)/Λ
∨). Then, the decision CLWE
problem, written D-CLWEq,Υ, is on input a collection of independent samples from either Πq,s,ψ
for a random choice of (s, ψ) ← U(Λ∨q ) × Υ or from UΛ, to decide which is the case with
non-negligible advantage.
A. Discussions
1) Relation to Module-LWE: First, we explain why we choose the order of multiplication
a · s. As discussed in the introduction, the transformation from a (primal) RLWE sample to
n related LWE samples provides our motivation. Here, one RLWE sample a · s + e, where
a, s, e ∈ Rq ∼= Zq [x]xn+1 , generates n LWE samples by considering the multiplication operation as
As + e, where A := rot(a) is a negacyclic matrix. For appropriate choices of error distributions,
this is precisely n LWE samples with the exception that there is some structure in the matrix
A. By ordering the multiplication a · s, we get a similar transform from CLWE to MLWE.
Assuming for now that we have a discretized form of CLWE, and observing that for q ∈ Z we
have Λq ∼=
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iOL/qOL (see [29]), we transform a CLWE sample a ·s+e into matrix-vector
form to get φ(a)·s+e, where s and e are vectors of dimension d over OL/qOL. Setting A = φ(a),
one can see that for appropriate choices of error distribution this is similar to d samples from
the MLWE distribution with some additional structure in the matrix A, as intended.
2) The Natural Order vs. Maximal Order: We consider Λ the natural order or a maximal
order. The natural order is simple to construct and represent, whereas finding a maximal order
is computationally slow. Additionally, the natural order is somewhat orthogonal, in the sense
that it has the same span in each ui coordinate independently of the other coordinates. This is
advantageous when considering the relation to MLWE, where the module is always taken to be
the full module OdK .
As mentioned above, two-sided ideals in a maximal order form a free abelian group, which
is not necessarily the case in the natural order. Further, as lattices, a maximal order gives denser
sphere packing than the natural order, since the latter is a sublattice. Fortunately, we will construct
in Section III-C1 cyclic algebras whose natural order is also maximal, thus enjoying both the
simplicity of the natural order and the convenience of a maximal order.
August 6, 2020 DRAFT
17
Example 2. Quaternion algebra over Q is defined by H = {x+ yj : x, y ∈ Q(i)}, with the
usual relations i2 = j2 = −1 and ij = −ji. It can be seen as a cyclic division algebra
(Q(i)/Q, (·),−1) where (·) denotes the complex conjugate and −1 is a non-norm element. A
quaternion has matrix representation (
x −y
y x
)
.
The Lipschitz integers L ⊂ H form the (non-maximal) natural order L = {x+ yj : x, y ∈ Z[i]} .
The maximal Hurwitz order is given by
H = {a+ bi+ cj + d(−1 + i+ j + ij)/2 : a, b, c, d ∈ Z} .
It is easy to check that, as Z-lattices of dimension 4, the Lipschitz order is a sublattice of the
Hurwitz order, of index 2.
3) A Pair of Number Fields: In MLWE, we are free to choose the dimension of our module
over the underlying number field K. However, in the cyclic algebra case we are restricted to cases
where we can find L,K, and γ such that A = (L/K, θ, γ) is well defined. From a theoretical
standpoint it is not immediately clear whether we want to consider asymptotic security in terms
of n or d, but following our motivation from MLWE we suggest that n is likely the suitable
choice since the module dimension d is typically small in applications using MLWE, whereas
the dimension of the underlying field K is large. However, there seems to be no a priori reason
why with the right techniques one could not consider both n and d asymptotically; the only case
a cyclic algebra precludes is high dimensional MLWE over a low dimension number field L,
because the parameter d occurs in both the module and field dimension.
B. Evading BCV Style Attacks
In our CLWE construction we have enforced that γ is selected so that A is a division algebra.
We do this to avoid attacks in the style of [22] on the m-RLWE protocol. For m = 2, the m-
RLWE protocol of [20] can be considered as a structured variant of MLWE, where the matrix
A in the operation As + e is a negacyclic matrix over some ring Rq. More explicitly, 2-RLWE
considers the tensor product of two fields K = K1 ⊗K2 and runs the LWE assumption in the
ring of integers Rq. The example use case given in [20] considers power-of-two cyclotomics
K1, K2 defined by the polynomials xk1 + 1 and yk2 + 1 respectively, claiming that the resulting
problem in Rq =
Zq [x,y]
(xk1+1,yk2+1)
effectively corresponds to an RLWE problem of dimension k1 ·k2
due to an obvious homomorphism between K and the two-power cyclotomic field L of degree
k1 · k2. The problem also represents a structured MLWE instance over Zq [x](xk1+1) of dimension k2.
However, the observation of [22] is that there is a smaller field K ′ containing K1 such that
there is a homomorphism from K into K ′ with a well defined image for y. This is because
the roots of distinct two-power cyclotomic polynomials are algebraically related. For example,
in the case k1 = 8, k2 = 4, it is clear that the map taking y to x2 and fixing K1 is a well
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defined homomorphism from K to K1. Using this homomorphism, [22] simplifies the problem
of solving one 2-RLWE instance by considering it as four RLWE instances in dimension k1
rather than one instance in dimension k1 · k2, essentially removing the module dimension k2
from the problem.
We argue that the non-norm condition of γ precludes the existence of a homomorphism
removing the module structure by taking a well defined cyclic algebra A = (L/K, θ, γ) to a
smaller subfield containing K. We restrict our search to maximal subfields of A, since any
subfield is contained in at least one maximal subfield. It is a well known result on division
algebras that any maximal subfield E of A contains K and satisfies [E : K] = d, and that in
the case of a cyclic division algebra A there is a choice of u′ ∈ A such that the cyclic algebra
A′ := ⊕j u′jE is isomorphic to A (see Section 15.1, Proposition a of [36]). Assume, for a
contradiction, that we had such a homomorphism χ : A → L, where without loss of generality
we assume the maximal subfield is L by the aforementioned proposition. Since L is Galois, the
restriction of χ to L is an automorphism of L. It is clear that χ must agree on conjugates, since
χ(u) · χ(`) = χ(u · `) = χ(θ(`) · u) = χ(u) · χ(θ(`)) for any ` ∈ L. However, this contradicts χ
being injective on L and it follows that no such homomorphism exists. Hence we conclude that
the attack style of [22] does not threaten our algebraic structure.
On the other hand, Appendix A shows that if γ violates the non-norm condition, then those
instances of the CLWE problem are potentially vulnerable. To sum up, the non-norm condition
is crucial to the hardness of the CLWE problem.
C. Concrete Algebras for CLWE
In order to apply the CLWE assumption in a practical cryptosystem one must choose a concrete
algebra as an ambient space. More generally, we are interested in finding families of algebras
suitable for CLWE that allow for asymptotic analysis and varied security levels. Our search for
algebras is motivated by the restrictions and conditions discussed in the previous section. In
particular, we are interested in cyclic division algebras satisfying the following properties:
• The non-norm element γ must lie in OK to keep the natural order closed under multiplica-
tion, and should satisfy |γ| = 1 in order to maintain both the coordinatewise independence
and sub-multiplicative properties of the norm2.
• The dimension n := [K : Q] of the division algebra should be large and the degree d :=
[L : K] should be small. This is to maintain the analogy with structured MLWE (the degree
corresponds to the module rank) and follows from the search-decision reduction, which
takes time polynomial in n but not in d.
• The base field K should be cyclotomic and q should split completely in K. This is also a
result of the methodology of the search-decision reduction, which uses the well understood
factorization of 〈q〉 in OK . In addition, since the bulk of lattice based cryptography is
2We abbreviate the condition |σi(γ)| = 1 for all i by |γ| = 1, since in fact these are equivalent for algebraic γ.
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done over cyclotomic fields, we consider algebras which are small extensions of these as
somewhat natural. We observe that an improved proof of decision security may allow this
point to be dropped, whereas the other two points feel more integral.
Although significant effort has been expended by coding theorists to construct cyclic division
algebras satisfying a variety of conditions, such as in [7] or [25], we find ourselves with a fairly
unique set of restrictions. In particular, for reasons relating to desired applications, the majority
of algebras used in coding theory are either of small total dimension or have small [K : Q]
and scale asymptotically in [L : K]. Since we are interested in scaling up K asymptotically, we
will have to build novel algebras satisfying the above requirements ourselves. We will, however,
make heavy use of the following theorem as an intermediate step. Here ζm denotes a primitive
mth root of unity where ϕ(m) = n is the degree of the base field K = Q(ζm).
Theorem 1 ([25]). Let m = pa be a prime power and let K = Q(ζm). Then, there exist
infinitely many cyclic Galois extensions L/K of degree m such that ζ im is not a norm of L/K
for 0 < i < m.
We remark that the theorem is effective in the sense that it provides an explicit description
of L, and we provide a summary of the recipe for constructing L. The crucial aspect of its
construction is that L is a subfield of some cyclotomic extension of K, K(ζ ′q) for a prime q
′,
but we present its full description for completeness.
First, find some prime q′ such that q′ = 1 mod pa but q′ 6= 1 mod pa+1, so that pa is the
highest power of p dividing q′− 13. Set M = K(ζq′) so that by coprimality M = Q(ζmq′). Then
Gal(M/K) is a cyclic group of order q′ − 1 generated by some automorphism σ. Denote by L
the subfield of M fixed by σm. Then [L : K] = m by the fundamental theorem of Galois theory
and the extension is both cyclic and Galois. Finally, localization theory is used to show that the
powers of ζm are not norms in this extension. In this way, the theorem constructs L explicitly.
The part of this theorem of our interest is that it allows us to scale K asymptotically, but this
comes with a drawback of very high degree L, i.e., it only permits a degree-m extension L of a
degree-ϕ(m) base field K. We present a new method that uses this theorem as a starting point
to construct good algebras satisfying our restrictions. More precisely, our construction will begin
with Theorem 1 and then use elementary methods from Galois theory to build more favourable
fields.
1) Constructions Using Subfields: We squash the field L from Theorem 1 to a subfield M
of small index over the base K satisfying the necessary properties to generate a cyclic algebra.
Theorem 2. Let K = Q(ζm), where ϕ(m) = n, be a prime power cyclotomic with m = pa for
some integer a and prime p. Then, there exists a cyclic Galois extension M/K of any index d
dividing m within which ζm satisfies the non-norm condition.
3It is easy to show that infinitely many primes satisfying this condition always exist by appealing to classical theorems of
Chebotarev or Dirichlet.
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Remark 4. Since the proof will provide an explicit description of M , the correct interpretation
of this theorem is that we can construct cyclic division algebras A = (M/K, θ, γ) with 〈θ〉 =
Gal(M/K), γ = ζm, K = Q(ζm), and [M : K] is any divisor of m = pa. Fig. 2 shows all
possible cases of intermediate field M between K and L.
Proof. Let K = Q(ζm) for a fixed m = pa with prime p and integer a. Following the construction
of Theorem 1 fix a cyclic Galois extension L/K of degree m such that ζ im is not a norm of an
element of L into K for any i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1. We will choose M as a suitable intermediate
extension L/M/K. Let σ denote the generator of Gal(L/K), an automorphism of degree m. For
d dividing m, σd fixes an extension M of K with [L : M ] = |Gal(L/M)| = m/d and it follows
from the tower lemma that [M : K] = d. We will show that M is a satisfactory extension of K.
First, since Gal(L/M) is a normal subgroup of Gal(L/K) we see that M/K is a normal, and
hence Galois4, extension. It follows from standard Galois Theory that
Gal(M/K) ∼= Gal(L/K)/Gal(L/M).
Both groups in the quotient are cyclic, and so Gal(M/K) is cyclic with some generator θ.
Furthermore, this isomorphism also allows us to deduce |Gal(M/K)| = d.
We’ve shown that M/K is a cyclic Galois extension of degree d; we are left to show that ζ im
is not a norm for i = 1, . . . , d − 1. Let L denote NL/K(L×) and M denote NM/K(M×). Say
ζ im ∈M , fixing x ∈M such that NM/K(x) = ζ im. Now by transitivity of the norm,
NL/K(x) = NM/K(NL/M(x))
= NM/K(x
m/d)
= ζ(m/d)im
where the first equality follows from x ∈M and the second since the norm is multiplicative. L
does not contain any power of ζm except ζmm = 1 since ζm is a non-norm element in L/K, so
it follows that m|(m/d)i and so d|i. From this we conclude that ζm, ζ2m, . . . , ζd−1m do not lie in
M and so ζm satisfies the non-norm condition.
Remark 5. We presented the proof in the above form for ease of legibility, but it is straightforward
to extend the argument in the final paragraph to show that ζjd+1m satisfies the non-norm condition
for any j = 0, 1, . . . , (m/d)− 1.
This is an effective construction that allows us to build cyclic division algebras of the form
A = (M/K, θ, γ) where |γ| = 1, K is an arbitrary prime power cyclotomic, and M is an
extension of K with degree divisible by the prime p. For cryptographically relevant examples,
we can consider degree 2 or 4 extensions of a 2-power cyclotomic or degree 3 extensions of
a 3-power cyclotomic. Given the impossibility result of Appendix B and the restriction on the
4Since in this case all extensions are separable.
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Fig. 2: Cyclic subfields between L and K.
absolute value of γ we view these algebras as essentially the best possible, at least for the case
where K is a prime-power cyclotomic.
As discussed in Section III-A, the natural order is not necessarily a maximal order. Neverthe-
less, the following theorem shows that the specific family of algebras we have constructed in
Section III-C1 represents a lucky case (its proof is given in Appendix C).
Theorem 3. For the family of cyclic division algebras A = (M/K, θ, ζm) constructed in
Theorem 2, the natural order of A is maximal.
This makes our constructed family of algebras very attractive, as it enjoys both the simplicity
of the natural order and the nice property of a maximal order.
Remark 6. In the context of multiblock space-time coding [25], the construction of Theorem 1
allows for a space-time code for m antennas and ϕ(m) blocks, i.e., a relatively small number
of blocks. With our new construction Theorem 2, any number ϕ(mk), k ∈ N of blocks becomes
possible. Further, using a maximal order leads to optimum coding gains; it was not realized in
[25] that the natural order from Theorem 1 is actually maximal.
D. Sample Parameters
Now that we have discussed our techniques for constructing suitable number fields we proceed
to demonstrate that these methods are able to attain cryptographically relevant dimensions. In
this section, we present a small selection of proof-of-concept dimensions in Table I where we
take our motivation for choices of dimension from KYBER and NewHope, since they are the
successful second round NIST candidates whose methods are most similar to our own. Thus
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we aim for dimensions in the region of between 512 and 1024, dimensions proposed for both
NewHope and KYBER (which also achieves dimension 768). Of course, these schemes are
restricted to having power-of-two ring dimension n and so their choices of dimension may not
be optimal in general, but FrodoKEM [37], a plain LWE scheme, suggests dimensions in around
the same range, specifically 640, 976, and 1344, so we consider dimensions in this region a
sensible starting point. Corresponding to KYBER and other MLWE based schemes we will set
a small ‘module’ rank d := [A : L]. We are constricted in our choice of fields by the fact that d
appears as a square in the total dimension N = nd2, but for the most part we are able to work
around this problem.
TABLE I: Sample Parameters of Cyclic Algebras. The subfield method is given in Section III-C,
while the compositum method is given in Appendix D.
Method Center K n = [K : Q] d = [L : K] Total Dimension N = nd2 of A
Subfield Q(ζ81) 54 3 486
Subfield Q(ζ256) 128 2 512
Subfield Q(ζ64) 32 4 512
Subfield Q(ζ512) 256 2 1024
Subfield Q(ζ128) 64 4 1024
Subfield Q(ζ243) 162 3 1458
Compositum Q(ζ192) 64 3 576
Compositum Q(ζ576) 192 2 768
Compositum Q(ζ384) 128 3 1152
1) Two-Power Cyclotomic K: We begin with straightforward cases where we can apply
Theorem 2 immediately to obtain fields in suitable dimensions. Let K be a two-power cyclotomic
field, K = Q(ζ2k), with dimension n := 2k−1. Since the rank d = [L : K] = [A : L] is a small
power of two, the dimension n of K will be dictated by the choice of module rank d. We
construct rank 2 and 4 examples as follows:
• For d = 2 we have [A : K] = 4, so for total dimension 1024 we set K = Q(ζ512).
• For d = 4 we have [A : K] = 16, so for total dimension 1024 we set K = Q(ζ128).
To obtain algebras in dimension 512 simply pick K with dimension n/2 e.g. Q(ζ256) and Q(ζ64)
respectively. In all cases, Theorem 2 lets us pick the non-norm element γ as a root of unity.
2) Three-Power Cyclotomic K: Since 3 - 1024, one can not achieve algebras in dimension
1024 with a 3-power cyclotomic center and instead we set about searching for algebras of nearby
dimensions. Although we are unable to build fields in this case with dimension around 1024, we
can get close to the more lightweight cryptographic dimension of 512 used in schemes targeting
a lower security level. Recall that if K = Q(ζ3k) then K has dimension n := φ(3k) = 2 · 3k−1.
Again, the module rank is a power of 3 and the choice of module rank will define the choice
of n.
August 6, 2020 DRAFT
23
• For d = 3 we have [A : K] = 9, so for total dimension 486 we set K = Q(ζ81). The next
achievable dimension is 1458, for which K = Q(ζ243).
• For d = 9 we have [A : K] = 81. To achieve the same total dimensions we take small base
fields K = Q(ζ9) and Q(ζ27) respectively.
3) Fields Using Compositum Techniques: The algebras with prime-power cyclotomic centers
of the previous subsections use the field construction technique of Theorem 2, and as such they
are restricted to algebras whose dimension N is in the form pk(p− 1) for a prime p and integer
k. In Appendix D, we present another method of constructing algebras using compositum fields
that allows us to target dimensions not achievable in this setting. The bottom three algebras of
dimensions 576, 768 and 1152 in Table I are obtained with this method.
E. Extensions Where q Splits Completely
All suggested algebras in the previous section satisfy the conditions required for our chosen
norm ‖σA(x)‖2 to be well-defined. In particular, they have root of unity non-norm γ and K is
cyclotomic. Because any q = 1 mod m splits completely in Q(ζm), it is straightforward to find
q which splits completely in OK .
Later in this paper, in order to enable efficient multiplication algorithms, it will turn out that it
is convenient to have a modulus q that splits completely into a product of prime ideals in both OK
and OL. Recall Lemmas 6 and 7 also require q be unramified in L. An appeal to Chebotarev’s
Density Theorem suggests that a proportion of 1/d of the primes q that split completely in K
also do so in L. In cases where d is small this suggests that finding such primes should not prove
too arduous; but since cryptosystems require specific parameters rather than density arguments,
we provide constructions satisfying the requisite conditions on q in Appendix E.
IV. SECURITY PROOF
The ‘standard’ security reductions used in [1] and [2] firstly reduce certain lattice problems to
search LWE and RLWE, then establish hardness of the decision problem via a search-decision
reduction. This proof follows a sequence of shorter reductions as shown in Fig. 3.
The reduction from the approximate SVP to the search LWE problem implies that search LWE
is at least as hard as approximate SVP. It can be explained as follows: first, the approximate
SVP is reduced to the problem of sampling a discrete Gaussian of narrow variance over a lattice,
where intuitively sampling from a sufficiently narrow Gaussian should output a vector whose
norm is reasonably short compared to the first minima. Then, a quantum algorithm reduces the
problem of sampling from a narrow Gaussian to that of solving the BDD problem on the lattice.
Finally, a transformation maps an instance of the BDD problem to an appropriate instance of
the LWE problem, reducing the BDD problem to that of search LWE.
For applications in cryptography, the hardness of the decision problem is preferred to that of
the search problem. Assuming that the decision problem is hard implies that LWE samples are
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Fig. 3: Reductions for LWE. The bold arrow denotes a quantum step.
computationally indistinguishable from uniform, so intuitively an LWE sample can be used to
hide a message m as an element of Znq by adding it to b.
Using similar machinery, we reduce a BDD problem to search CLWE using the same method
as in [2]. The methodology of their search-decision reduction is an adaptation of that of Regev’s,
which relies on guessing each coordinate of the secret s separately. The adaptation to the ring
case instead guesses the coordinate of the secret ring element s modulo a suitable collection of
ideals pi such that guessing s mod piO∨K requires only a polynomial number of guesses, from
which s is recovered using the CRT. We apply a similar method in suitable subrings to deduce the
hardness of our decision problem. The main technical novelty is to deal with non-commutativity
in the proof.
For the remainder of this paper, we will always be working in an extension of number fields
L/K, where [L : Q] = [L : K] · [K : Q] = d · n. Recall from the motivation of structured
MLWE and the sample algebras given that in practice we seek asymptotic security in n, since
the parameter d corresponds to the typically small module dimension.
A. Hardness of Search CLWE
Definition 21. We define the family of error distributions Σα as the set of all Gaussian distri-
butions DΣ over
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR with covariance matrix obtained as the distribution of the error in
Lemma 11.
This is the family of error distributions we will claim hardness of search CLWE for; although
specifying this family of matrices precisely is not simple, we demonstrate how the error is
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obtained in the BDD transformation step. For now, we remark that it is a Gaussian distribution
whose marginals are Gaussian with variance at most α.
In the following theorem we denote by A−DGSξ the problem of sampling a discrete Gaussian
DI,ξ, where I is some ideal of the order Λ.
Theorem 4. Let A be a cyclic division algebra over a number field L with center K and natural,
maximal order Λ with |γ| = 1. Let α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1) and q = q(n) ≥ 2, unramified in L, be
parameters such that α · q ≥ ω(1). Then, there is a polynomial-time quantum reduction from
A-DGSξ to search CLWEq,Σα for any ξ = r ·
√
dω(
√
log (d · n))/αq, where r > √2q · ηε(I).
From this we deduce the following corollary, similarly to [3], since the lattice structure of
our algebra is merely a special case of their modules. We denote by N the total dimension of
A, N := nd2.
Corollary 1. Let A,Λ, α and q be as above. Then, there is a polynomial-time quantum reduction
from A-SIVPξ to search CLWEq,Σα for any
√
8Nd · ξ = (ω(√dn)/α).
The following theorem is our analogy of Lemma 4.10 of [3].
Theorem 5. Given an oracle that solves CLWEq,Σα for input α ∈ (0, 1), an integer q ≥ 2, an
ideal I ⊂ Λ, a number r ≥ √2q ·η(I) satisfying r′ := r ·ω(√logN)/(αq) > √2N/λ1(I∨), and
polynomially many samples from the discrete Gaussian DI,r there exists an efficient quantum
algorithm that outputs an independent sample from DI,r′ .
We can then prove Theorem 4 in the standard iterative manner; for a very large value of r,
e.g. r ≥ 22NλN(I), start by sampling classically from DI,r. Then apply the above algorithm
to obtain a polynomial number of samples from DI,r′ . Repeating this step gives samples from
progressively narrower distributions, until we arrive at the desired Gaussian parameter s ≥ ξ.
In order to classically sample the initial collection of Gaussian samples, we use the standard
Lemma 3.2 of [1] to sample DI,r on the module representation
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR. As usual, we obtain
Theorem 5 in two steps, first the main reduction of Lemma 11, then the following quantum step
adapted from [1]. We use a form of A−BDDL,δ from [3] where we bound the offset in the norm
‖e‖2,∞ := maxj
√
(
∑d−1
i=0 |σj(ei)|2) ≤ δ, where σ denotes the canonical embedding of L.
Lemma 9. There is an efficient quantum algorithm that given any N = n ·d2 dimensional lattice
L := σA(I) for some ideal I, a real δ < λ1(L∗)/(2
√
2nd), and an oracle that solves A-BDDL∗,δ
with all but negligible probability, outputs an independent sample from DL,√dω(
√
log(nd))/
√
2δ
.
For the reduction of BDD to Search CLWE, we begin with the cyclic algebra analogy of the
BDD-to-LWE samples transformation from Section 4 of [2]. As is standard for LWE security,
we use the following ‘modulo q’ definition of BDD:
Definition 22. For any q ≥ 2 the qA−BDDI,d problem is as follows: given an instance of
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the A−BDDI,δ problem y = x + e with solution x ∈ I and error e ∈
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR satisfying
‖e‖2,∞ ≤ δ, output x mod qI.
We use (a special case of) Lemma 3.5 from [1], which lifts immediately since it is lattice
preserving.
Lemma 10. For any q ≥ 2 there is a deterministic polynomial time reduction from A−BDDI,d
to qA−BDDI,d.
We now present an algorithm which transforms qA-BDD samples to CLWE samples given
some additional Gaussian samples. The algorithm is the same in spirit as Lemma 4.7 of [2], but
has some technical differences induced by the structure of cyclic algebras.
Lemma 11. Let A be as in Theorem 4. There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that
on input a prime integer q ≥ 2, a fractional ideal I∨ ⊂ Λ, a qA−BDD
L,αq·ω(
√
log(nd))/
√
2nd·r
instance y = x + e where x ∈ I∨, a parameter r ≥ √2q · η(I), and samples from the discrete
Gaussian DI,r′ with r′ ≥ r, outputs samples that are within negligible statistical distance of the
CLWE distribution Πq,s,Σ for a secret s = χt(x mod qI∨) ∈ Λ∨q , where χt is as in Lemma 7
and Σ is an error distribution such that in the case where |γ| = 1 the resulting error e′′ has
marginal distribution in its i, j th coordinate that is Gaussian with parameter ri,j ≤ α.
Proof. The proof will be in two parts - first, we will describe the algorithm, then we will prove
correctness. Recall that in the definition of CLWE, a sample is in the form (a, b) = (a, (a·s)/q+e
mod Λ∨), where e is taken from an error distribution ψ ∈ Σα.
Begin by computing an element t ∈ I such that I−1 · 〈t〉 and 〈q〉 are coprime using Lemma 6.
We can now create a sample from the CLWE distribution as follows: take an element z ← DI,r′
from the Gaussian samples, and compute a pair
(a, b) = (ξ−1t (z mod qI), (z · y)/q + e′ mod Λ∨) ∈ (Λq × (
d−1⊕
i=0
uiLR)/Λ
∨)
where e′ ← Dα/√2.
We now claim that these samples are within negligible statistical distance of the CLWE
distribution and that s is uniformly random. First we show that a ∈ Λq is statistically close
to uniform. By assumption, r ≥ q · η(I) and so by appealing to Lemma 1 it can be seen that
any value z mod qI is obtained with probability in the interval [1−ε
1+ε
, 1] · β for some positive
β, from which it follows immediately that the statistical distance between z mod qI and the
uniform distribution is bounded above by 2ε. Since χt of Lemma 7 and its inverse are both
bijections, we conclude that a = χ−1t (z mod qI) is within statistical distance 2ε of the uniform
distribution over Λq.
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Now we must show that b is in the form (a · s)/q + e′′, for some suitable error e′′ and a
uniformly random s, where we condition on some fixed value of a. By construction,
b : = (z · y)/q + e′ mod Λ∨
= (z · x)/q + (z · e)/q + e′ mod Λ∨,
so since z = t · a mod Λ∨q and t lies in the center of A it follows that (z ·x)/q = (a · t ·x)/q =
(a · s)/q mod Λ∨ for s := χt(x mod qI∨). It follows that s is uniformly random over Λ∨q as
long as x is uniform over I∨, since χt is a bijection.
Finally it is left to show that, conditioned on a fixed value of a, the marginal distribution of
the i, j th coordinate of the error term e′′ = (z · e)/q + e′ is negligibly close to that specified by
Σ. We can explicitly calculate the error as
e′′ =
d−1∑
i=0
ui(
∑
j+k=i
θk(zj) · ek(1− (1− γ)1j+k≥d)) + e′ (1)
where the sum j+k is taken modulo d and the functon (1−(1−γ)1j+k≥d) is 1 if j+k < d and γ
otherwise5. Since |γ| = 1 and z ← DI,r is spherically distributed, it follows that multiplying by
γ and applying the permutation of j coordinates induced by θ does not change the distribution of
zi,j . Hence, each marginal distribution may be analyzed independently as in the case of MLWE,
and the result follows using the analysis of the error from Lemma 4.15 of [3].
Though we do not specify the covariance of Σ, one can see that each entry of σA(z) appears
in σA(e′′) exactly d times, and so by symmetry each element of σA(e′′) has non-zero correlation
with at most d2 other entries. Hence, a proportion of at most nd
4
n2d4
= 1
n
of entries of Σ are
non-zero.
B. Search To Decision Reduction
In this section we will show that the hardness of decision CLWE follows from that of the
search problem. Once again, we will follow a combination of the expositions of [2] and [3] for
the ring and module cases, making necessary changes for the structure of cyclic algebras. We
will make heavy use of the following CRT style decomposition, a rephrasing of [29, Lemma 4].
Lemma 12. Let Λ be the natural order of a cyclic algebra A = (L/K, θ, γ) and let I be an
ideal of OK which splits completely as I = q1...qn as an ideal of OK . Then, we have the
isomorphism
Λ/IΛ ∼= R1 × ...×Rn,
where Ri =
⊕d−1
j=0 u
j(OL/qiOL) is the ring subject to the relations (`+qiOL)u = u(θ(`)+qiOL)
and ud = γ + qi.
5This term is just indicating whether or not we have had to use the relation ud = γ in this summand or not.
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Of course, this is not a true CRT decomposition, because we are considering ideals of OK
rather than those of Λ. In the case where γ is a unit, Λ∨ =
⊕
i u
iO∨L and the above lemma is
also valid in the case where each instance of OL and Λ are replaced with their respective duals.
As in [2], our reduction will be limited to certain choices of algebras. The above lemma
considers the splitting of the ideal I as an ideal of the base field K. Setting I = 〈q〉, the ideal
generated by the modulus q, we will consider cases where q splits completely in the base field.
Now consider the family of algebras A in Section III-C and let K = Q(ζpa) have dimension n.
It follows that if q ≡ 1 mod pa then q splits completely into a product of prime ideals q1, ..., qn
as an ideal of OK . Hence, we obtain the decomposition
Λ/qΛ ∼= R1 × ...×Rn
where Ri is as is Lemma 12.
Also as in [2], we see no way to avoid randomizing the error distribution in the resulting deci-
sion problem. Further, we require that an oracle for D-CLWEq,Υα on an algebra A = (L/K, θ, γ)
is also an oracle for the decision problem on any algebra A′ = (L/K, θ, γ′) over the same number
fields L,K and some other root of unity γ′ ∈ OK . Intuitively this implies that for fixed L and K
as in Section III-C the hardness of the D-CLWE problem is invariant under the choice of root of
unity γ, and will be required for Lemma 15. This is because there exist efficient, easy-to-compute
isomorphisms isomorphisms sending A to A′, which we will define shortly.
The main theorem of this section is Theorem 6; we emphasize that our algorithm is only
intended to be efficient in the dimension n of the base field K, since we expect to fix d as a
small constant in practice. We will prove Theorem 6 in the usual manner: first we show that
it is sufficient to recover the value of s ∈ Λ∨/qΛ∨ in one of the rings Ri (Lemma 13). Then,
we use a hybrid distribution to define a decision problem in Ri, for which we demonstrate a
search to decision reduction (Lemma 14). We then use a hybrid argument to conclude the proof
(Lemma 16).
1) CLWE in Ri: In this section we will abuse notation and denote by s mod Ri the value
of s ∈ Λ∨/qΛ∨ in the Ri coordinate under the isomorphism of Lemma 12.
Definition 23. The Ri−CLWEq,Σα problem is to find the value s mod Ri given access to the
CLWE distribution Πq,s,Σ for some arbitrary Σ ∈ Σα.
In the following lemmata we make use of the automorphisms of K coordinatewise on the rings
Ri. Since K is a Galois extension of Q and q splits completely, it follows that the automorphisms
σi of K act transitively on the ideals qi. We demonstrate how to extend these to functions of A.
First, extend these automorphisms to automorphisms αi of L in some arbitrary manner. Then,
we can extend these to isomorphisms αi : A → A′, with A′ = (L/K, θ, γ′), which agree with
αi on L and send u to u′ with u′d = αi(γ) and xu′ = u′θ(x) for x ∈ L. By the construction
of K from [25], αi(γ) is a non-norm element since it is some primitive nth root of unity, and
so it is easy to check that this A′ is a well defined division algebra and that αi is indeed an
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isomorphism which sends A to A′. Furthermore, it fixes the family of error distributions Σα.
This is because each component of z · e+ e′ is defined coordinatewise over the d copies of LR
in the module representation of A, and since αi induces the same permutation of the entries of
the canonical embedding of L in each coordinate as an automorphism of L it fixes the family of
choices for each of z, e, e′; hence since αi is an isomorphism the family of distributions z ·e+e′
is fixed. It follows that the extended αi function maps the Ri−CLWEq,Σα problem in A to the
same problem in A′, and moreover that this map preserves Λ∨ and the CRT style decomposition
(Lemma 12) of Λ∨q by sending Ri to some Rj , where j depends on the choice of σi. We are
now ready for the first step of our reduction.
Lemma 13. There is a deterministic polynomial time reduction from CLWEq,Σ to Ri−CLWEq,Σ.
Proof. Let Oi be an oracle for the Ri−CLWEq,Σ problem. Since Lemma 12 defines an isomor-
phism, it is sufficient to use Oi to solve the Rj−CLWEq,Σ for each j. Let αj/i be an extension
of the automorphism of K mapping qj to qi, which exists by transitivity. Then, given a sample
(a, b) ← Πq,s,Σ, we construct the sample (αj/i(a), αj/i(b)). Since Λq and Λ∨q are fixed by each
αj/i, the resulting pair is a valid CLWE sample in A′ = (L/K, θ, αj/i(γ)); feeding these samples
into Oi outputs a value tj mod Ri.
We claim α−1j/i(tj) = s mod Rj . Since αj/i is an automorphism, each sample (a, b) is mapped
to a new CLWE sample (αj/i(a), αj/i(a · s/q+ e) mod Λ∨) in a new algebra A′. We may write
the second coordinate as αj/i(a) · αj/i(s)/q + αj/i(e) mod Λ∨. Since our automorphisms fix
our family of error distributions and map the uniform distribution to the uniform distribution, it
follows that this is a valid CLWE instance with secret αj/i(s) and error distribution Σ′. Hence,
Oi outputs t = αj/i(s) mod Ri, from which we recover α−1j/i(t) = s mod Rj , as required.
2) Hybrid CLWE and Search-Decision: For this section we must introduce the cyclic algebra
analog of the Hybrid LWE distribution used in [2]; we use the decomposition into the rings Ri
rather than the CRT.
Definition 24. For a secret s ∈ Λ∨q , distribution Σ over
⊕
j u
jLR, and i ∈ [n], we define a
sample from the distribution Πiq,s,Σ over Λq × (
⊕d−1
i=0 u
iLR)/Λ
∨ by taking (a, b) ← Πq,s,Σ and
h ∈ Λ∨q which is uniformly random and independent mod Rj, j ≤ i and 0 mod Rj, j > i,
and outputting (a, b+ h/q). If i = 0,we define Π0q,s,Σ = Πq,s,Σ.
Using this distribution we define a worst-case decision problem relative to one Ri and reduce
it to the search problem Ri−CLWE.
Definition 25. For i ∈ [n] and a family of distributions Σα, the W-D-CLWEiq,Σα problem is
defined as the problem of finding j given access to Πjq,s,Σ for j ∈ {i − 1, i} and valid CLWE
secret and error distribution s,Σ.
For a technical reason in the following proof, we restrict our secret s so that s mod Ri lies
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in a set Gi with the property that g 6= h ∈ Gi implies g − h is an invertible element. Applying
this restriction for each i places s ∈ G for a set G = G1 × · · · ×Gn of size |G| =
∏
i |Gi|. We
will call such a set G a pairwise different set. We need to guarantee that there exist sufficiently
large choices of G. It is not difficult to see that the maximal set sizes |Gi| = qd and |G| = qnd,
because any set of matrices in Md×d(Fq) of size at least qd + 1 contains two matrices with the
same first row, whose difference is therefore uninvertible. Constructions of such maximal sets
G are given in Appendix F.
Lemma 14. Assuming s ∈ G, there is a probabilistic polynomial-time reduction from Ri−CLWEq,s,Σα
to W-D-CLWEiq,Σ for any i ∈ [n].
Proof. We follow the standard search-decision methodology of guessing the value of the secret
mod Ri and then modifying the samples so that the decision oracle tells us whether or not our
guess was correct. Note that there are only |Gi| possible values of s mod Ri, which is bounded
above by qd2 , polynomial in n, and so we may efficiently enumerate over the possible values.
We define the transform which takes a value g ∈ Λ∨q and maps Πq,s,Σ to Πi−1q,s,Σ if g = s
mod Ri or Πiq,s,Σ otherwise as follows. On input a CLWE sample (a, b) ← Πq,s,Σ, output the
pair
(a′, b′) = (a+ v, b+ (h+ vg)/q) ∈ Λq × (
d−1⊕
i=0
uiLR)/Λ
∨,
where v ∈ Λq is uniformly random mod Ri and 0 mod Rj for j 6= i and h ∈ Λ∨q is uniformly
random and independent mod Rj, j < i and 0 on the other Rj . It is clear that a′ is still uniformly
distributed on Λq, so we are left to show b′ is correctly distributed. For a fixed value of a′, we
write
b′ = b+ (h+ vg)/q
= (as+ h+ vg)/q + e
= (a′s+ h+ v(g − s))/q + e,
where e is still drawn from Σ. If g = s mod Ri, then v(g − s) = 0 mod Ri, and so the
distribution of the pair (a′, b′) is precisely Πi−1q,s,Σ. Otherwise, v(g− s) is uniformly random mod
Ri by assumption on G and 0 mod the other Rj , and so letting h′ = h + v(g − s) we see that
the distribution of (a′, b′) is precisely Πiq,s,Σ.
Remark 7. This is the only stage of the proof which enforces that the asymptotic complexity
scales only with n and not with d, since we are forced to guess all of s mod Ri at once.
Since the above reduction is secret preserving the required decision oracle for W-D-CLWEiq,Σα
has the additional restriction that s ∈ G, but for the purposes of the rest of our proof it will
be more convenient to have access to an oracle solving the at least as hard problem where s is
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arbitrary. Additionally, in practical applications we will use the decision problem for arbitrary
s, so we see no benefit of the tighter reduction where s is restricted.
3) Worst-Case to Average-Case Decision Reduction: Now that we have removed the restriction
that s ∈ G, we are able to follow the skeleton of the RLWE search-decision reduction of [2]
more liberally.
Definition 26. The error distribution Υα on the family of possible error distributions is sampled
from by choosing an error distribution Σ ← Σα and adding it to Dr, where each ri := α((n ·
d2)1/4 · √yi) for y1, ..., yn·d2 sampled from Γ(2, 1).
Definition 27. For i ∈ [n] and a distribution Υα over possible error distributions, an algorithm
solves the D-CLWEiq,Υα problem if with a non-negligible probability over the choice pairs
(s,Σ) ← U(Λ∨q ) × Υα it has a non-negligible difference in acceptance probability on inputs
from Πiq,s,Σ and Π
i−1
q,s,Σ.
This is the average case decision problem relative to Ri; in our worst-case to average-case
reduction we will need to randomize the choice of error distribution, which we do by sampling
from Υα.
Lemma 15. For any α > 0 and i ∈ [n] there is a randomized polynomial-time reduction from
W-D-CLWEiq,Σα to D-CLWE
i
q,Υα
.
Proof. Since the definition of Υα is a distribution over the family of distributions obtained by
sampling from Σα and adding an elliptical Gaussian, the proof is the same as Lemma 5.12 of
[2], except we replace each instance of mod qiR∨ with mod Ri and each instance of Rq with
Λq.
Remark 8. This choice of Υα means that our decision problem is closer to diagonal than
the corresponding search problem! In fact, if one increased the elliptical error in the decision
problem, one could ‘flood out’ the non-diagonal entries of the covariance matrix, leading to
elliptical error which is easier to handle in practice.
Finally, we use a hybrid argument. We must first show that Πnq,s,Σ is uniformly random given
Σ sampled from Υα, but again this follows the same method as the ring case, except we must
replace their use of Lemma 1 by [38, Lemma 2.4].
Lemma 16. Let Υα be as above and let s ∈ Λ∨q . Then given an oracle O which solves the D-
CLWEq,Υα problem there exists an efficient algorithm that solves D-CLWEiq,Υα for some i ∈ [n]
using O.
Proof. The proof is identical to the ring case, Lemma 5.14 of [2], except that the indexing set
Z∗m is replaced by [n].
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Denote by CLWEq,Σα,G the search CLWE problem where s ∈ G for arbitrary fixed G ⊂ Λ∨q .
To sum up, we have obtained the main result of this section:
Theorem 6. Let Λ be the natural order of a cyclic algebra A = (L/K, θ, γ), q ∈ poly(n) and
assume that α·q ≥ ηε(Λ∨) for a negligible ε = ε(n). Then, there is a probabilistic reduction from
CLWEq,Σα,G for any pairwise different G ⊂ Λ∨q to D-CLWEq,Υα which runs in time polynomial
in n.
C. Summary of Security Proof
There are certain technicalities and subtleties in our security proof, which we briefly summarize
as follows.
The hardness of Search CLWE in Section IV-A requires a natural, maximal order Λ. Nonethe-
less, Lemma 11 (due to Lemmas 6 and 7) is the only stage of the proof that assumes such a
natural, maximal order. An improved proof technique may be able to drop this assumption (e.g.,
to use the natural order). The search to decision reduction in Section IV-B requires a natural
order Λ, due to the CRT decomposition of Lemma 12. A better version of CRT may extend
the reduction to a maximal order. Fortunately, the orders we take from Section III-C1 are both
natural and maximal, thereby meeting these requirements. The requirement of unramified q in
Theorem 4 (due to Lemma 6) is minimal: for the algebras of Theorem 2, the only unsuitable
primes are the p and q′ used in the construction (cf. Section III-C).
Lemma 14 in Section IV-B2 enforces that s lies in a pairwise different set G. It is the only
stage of the proof which requires such a set. We emphasize that our reduction takes the search
CLWE problem where s ∈ G for arbitrary fixed G to the decision CLWE problem for arbitrary
secret s. In other words, we claim hardness for the full decision problem, based on hardness of
a restricted search problem. Also, our reduction implies that the decision problem is as hard as
the search problem for the hardest choice of G. See Appendix F for more details.
Remark 9. The so-called normal form is used de facto in LWE-based cryptography. We note
that the normal form reduction is agnostic to the secret space G. More precisely, secret s ∈ G
gets completely cancelled in the transformation and replaced by a new secret s′ over the entire
space (see of Lemma 18 in Section V-A). Therefore, the secret space in the normal form of CLWE
is the entire space, after all.
In practice it may be a concern with security of CLWE if these reductions were best possible
(e.g. decision CLWE is polynomial-time equivalent to restricted search, rather than at least as
hard). In any case, our secret space is still exponentially large in n.
V. CLWE IN CRYPTOGRAPHY
In this section we present a proof of concept cryptosystem using CLWE. To demonstrate
our comparison against MLWE our scheme will closely resemble the typical ‘compact’ LWE
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cryptography schemes over modules, in particular KYBER (see [5]), although it is likely that
an adaptation of Regev style encryption from [1] would suit CLWE as well.
A. Making CLWE Suitable For Cryptography: Normal Form
We implicitly use some standard LWE facts: firstly, we discretize our error distribution e to
Λ∨q ; discretizing does not reduce security since an attacker may always discretize the samples
themselves. Secondly, we can ‘tweak’ the problem so that e, s ∈ Λq. Fortunately, in the case
where γ is a unit, Λ∨ =
⊕
i u
iO∨L and so this tweak is precisely multiplying on the right by the
tweak factor taking O∨L to OL (see e.g. [39]). Finally, we require hardness of a ‘normal’ form
for the CLWE distribution, where s is sampled from the same distribution as the noise e.
We require two facts for our proof: firstly, given that q splits completely in K the ring Λq is
isomorphic to the direct product of n full matrix algebras over Md×d(Fq), which can be seen
by appealing to the CRT-style decomposition of Lemma 12 and Wedderburn’s Theorem as in
[29, Propositions 1 and 4]. Secondly, we require that a non-negligible fraction in n of elements
of Λq are invertible, which follows for fixed, small, d and q ∈ poly(n) from this direct product
decomposition. Otherwise, our proof follows the outline for that of plain LWE from [40]. Given
these two facts, we proceed with showing that the normal form of the CLWE distribution is as
hard as the case of taking the secret uniformly at random.
Lemma 17. For a fixed d and q ≥ (n + 1), a non-negligible proportion of elements of Λq are
invertible.
Proof. Following the decomposition of Lemma 12 and Wedderburn’s Theorem, it is sufficient
to show that a non-negligible proportion of elements of
Md×d(Fq)× · · · ×Md×d(Fq)
are invertible, where there are n copies of Md×d(Fq). The proportion of invertible elements of
Md×d(Fq) is precisely
(qd − 1)(qd − q) . . . (qd − qd−1)
qd2
= (
qd − 1
qd
) . . . (
qd − qd−1
qd
)
= (1− 1
qd
) . . . (1− 1
q
)
≥ (1− 1
q
)d,
from which it follows that the total fraction of invertible elements in Λq is at least ((1− 1q )d)n.
By assumption, q ≥ n+ 1, and so (1− 1
q
)nd ≥ ((1− 1
n+1
)n)d ≥ (e−1)d = e−d, as required.
Remark 10. This lower bound of e−d means that the normal form reduction will be asymptotic
in n but only valid for fixed d. However, as d increases the number of invertible matrices in Λq
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is bounded above by (1− 1
q
)nd, and so the reduction would be efficient in d in the case where
one enforced a relation on q and d, such as q ≥ nd+ 1, or more succinctly q ≥ N .
Lemma 18. There is a probabilistic polynomial time reduction from the CLWE problem with
uniformly random secret s, possibly over a limited secret space G, and error distribution χ to
the CLWE problem with secret s′ ← χ.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that there is an efficient transformation taking samples with secret
s to samples with some new secret s′ taken from χ. Sample pairs (a, b) ← Πq,s,χ until a pair
(a1, b1 := a1 · s+ e1) such that a1 is invertible in Λq is obtained. Since a non-negligible fraction
of elements of Λq are invertible by Lemma 17, this step takes only polynomial time.
Now, given a pair (ai, bi) ← Πq,s,χ, we obtain a sample from the CLWE distribution Πq,e1,χ
by outputting (ai, bi) = (aia−11 , aia
−1
1 b1 − bi). Since a−11 is invertible, ai is uniform. Similarly,
aia
−1
1 b1 − bi = (aia−11 (a1 · s+ e1))− ai · s+ ei
= aia
−1
1 e1 − ei,
and so (ai, bi) is a valid CLWE sample with secret e1 and error distribution χ. Relabelling e1
as s′ completes the proof.
B. Sample Cryptosystem
Our scheme is parameterized by an algebra A := (L/K, θ, γ), where A is as in Section III-C,
an error distribution Σ, and a prime modulus q ≡ 1 mod m (recall K = Q(ζm)) which is
completely split in L. We will denote with bold faced letters the vector form of an element of
Λq, e.g. if a = a0 + ua1 + ... + ud−1ad−1 then a = (a0, a1, ..., ad−1). We note that OL/qOL has
a polynomial representation of dimension n · d, and so we encode our message ∈ {0, 1}n·d2 as
an entry of Λq as a vector m of d {0, 1} polynomials. The scheme proceeds as follows:
• Alice generates a CLWE sample (a, b := a · s+ e), where a ∈ Λq is uniformly random and
e← Σ, and outputs public key a,b.
• To encrypt m ∈ {0, 1}n·d2 , Bob samples t, e1, e2 ← Σ and outputs u := φ(a)T t + e1, v :=
φ(b)T t + e2 + d q2c ·m.
• To decrypt, Alice computes c = v−φ(s)Tu and recovers each coordinate of m by rounding
the corresponding entry of c to 0 or d q
2
c and outputting 0 or 1 respectively.
Remark 11. There are two benefits of instantiating this scheme in the cyclic algebra setting
rather than over modules as in [5], both following from the matrix embedding φ. Firstly, in the
module setting Alice must publish a matrix A rather than the vector a in her key, since φ(a)
lets us generate a matrix; this saves a factor of d in the size of the public key. Secondly, by
extending b to φ(b) we are able to increase the dimension of v, and correspondingly increase
the size of the message by a factor of d.
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Example 3. Recall our explicit algebras from Section III-C. Without considering streamlined
implementation for specific NIST submissions, we will pick toy comparison parameters for
equivalent module based systems and ring based schemes, e.g. KYBER and NewHope. For the
module case, consider a module of dimension 4 over a ring L of dimension 256, with 2-power
cyclotomic base field [K : Q] = 64. Our public key (a, b) requires storing only 8 elements
of Rq = OL/q · OL rather than 20 in the form (A, b). Our message consists of 1024 bits,
corresponding to the total dimension of the algebra rather than the module versions 256 which
corresponds to the field dimension; if the private key size is 256, our CLWE scheme allows a
rate-1/4 binary error correction code, while KYBER does not. Our ciphertext sizes are the same.
As far as the modulus q is concerned, we find q = 3329 splits completely in a quartic cyclic
extension L of K. This matches with the modulus q used in KYBER6. Overall this represents a
noteworthy gain in key and message size without loss in efficiency. For the ring case, consider
an instantiation of NewHope in dimension 1024. Both public keys are in the form (a, s) and so
require equivalent levels of storage (8 elements of a field of dimension 256 or 2 in dimension
1024), and the same phenomenon is true of ciphertext sizes and message length. However, a
larger modulus q = 12289 is ued in NewHope. Hence, we hope to gain in security without losing
much efficiency.
Before considering security and correctness we need a somewhat technical lemma allowing
the use of the matrix transpose operation. Essentially, it states that if the CLWE problem is hard
in an algebra A, then for a, s, e ∈ Λq, the equation φ(a)T s+e is a valid CLWE instance in some
other algebra A′ for which the CLWE problem is still hard.
Lemma 19. Let A = (L/K, θ, γ) be a cyclic division algebra with matrix embedding φ(a)
and natural order Λ. Then there exists another cyclic algebra A′ = (L/K, θ, γ−1) with matrix
embedding φ′(a′) and natural order Λ′ such that for a ∈ A there exists a′ ∈ Λ′ satisfying φ(a)T =
φ′(a′). Moreover, A′ still satisfies the division algebra condition, and Λ′q are Λq canonically
isomorphic as additive groups.
Proof. The fact that A′ is still a division algebra follows from the non-norm property on γ and
the fact that NL/K(L×) is a multiplicative group. Λ′q and Λq are additive isomorphic because both
algebras share the same underlying fields and γ, γ−1 are both units of OL. Since the first row of
φ(a) is precisely (x0, γθ(xd−1), γθ2(xd−2), . . . , γθd−1(x1)), by setting a′ = x0+uγθ(xd−1)+· · ·+
ud−1γθd−1(x1) and observing that θd is the identity it is easy to check that φ(a)T = φ′(a′).
The proofs of correctness and security are similar in spirit to those of other compact LWE
schemes such as e.g. NewHope [4] or KYBER [5]. We proceed with a somewhat informal
security argument.
6The initial version of KYBER uses q = 7681, but it has been reduced to 3329 later which does not split completely in
L = Q(ζ512). It is noteworthy that, with a similar technique, further reduction of q in CLWE may also be possible.
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Lemma 20. The defined scheme is IND-CPA secure under the assumption that the decision
CLWEq,Υ problem is hard.
Proof. The goal of an IND-CPA adversary is to distinguish, with non-negligible advantage,
between encryptions of two plaintexts m1,m2. The challenger chooses i ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at
random and encrypts mi as u, v. By the assumption that the decision CLWE problem is hard,
the adversary cannot distinguish between the case where b = as + e and the case where it is
replaced by a uniform random b′, so we replace the challenge ciphertext v with v′ by replacing
b with b′. Setting v′′ := v′ − d q
2
c ·mi, it follows by Lemma 19 that u, v′′ represent two samples
from a valid CLWE distribution with secret t, and so the adversary cannot distinguish them
from uniform with non-negligible advantage. Hence, the challenger cannot distinguish v′ and
hence v from uniform with non-negligible advantage and so cannot guess i with non-negligible
advantage.
Finally, we demonstrate conditions on the error term for the scheme to be correct.
Lemma 21. The defined scheme is correct as long as the `∞ norm of e′ = (φ(e)T t+e2−φ(s)T e1)
is less than d q
4
c, where the `∞ norm is over the vector of all polynomial coefficients of each ui
entry of e′ of dimension n · d2.
Proof. To decrypt, Alice computes v − φ(s)Tu and computes m by rounding. Since φ(·) is a
homomorphism, we have
v− φ(s)Tu = φ(b)T t + e2 + dq
2
c ·m− φ(s)T (φ(a)T t + e1)
= φ(e)T t + e2 − φ(s)T e1 + dq
2
c ·m
= e′ + dq
2
c ·m.
from which the result follows immediately.
We note that the error term e′ will be unsurprising to those familiar with LWE based cryptog-
raphy. Although we do not provide concrete correctness estimations, the error parameters for our
decision reduction are equivalent to those of MLWE up to some small covariance terms. We do
not expect this covariance to greatly affect the distribution of the error and thus for equivalent
parameter choices we expect a similarly small probability of decryption failure.
C. Operational Complexity in Cyclic Algebras
In the previous subsection we showed that the CLWE problem can be used to construct a
standard LWE based cryptosystem. Assuming that parameters across all variants of the LWE
assumption are roughly equivalent, the CLWE problem supports key and message sizes as
advantageous as those of the RLWE problem, and better than those of the module case. Along
with storage considerations, another important facet of the ambient space in LWE cryptography
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is the efficiency of operations. Here, we will construct algorithms and consider the asymptotic
complexity of multiplication in a cyclic algebra in order to compare it to the ring and module
variants. Since in practice we consider operations modulo some prime q, addition in rings,
modules, and cyclic algebras can be considered as addition in vector spaces over Zq, which has
complexity dominated by that of multiplication.
Consequentially, we only concern ourselves with a comparison of the cost of computing the
multiplication operation As in the three cases. In order to keep our comparison consistent, we
let N denote the total dimension of the underlying LWE instance. In the ring case, N denotes
the ring dimension; in the module case, N = nd, where n denotes the ring dimension and d
the module rank; in the cyclic algebra case N = nd2, where the ring dimension is nd and
the algebra has ‘module’ rank d. However, since it will be important later we remark here that
the cyclotomic part of the ring will be of dimension n rather than nd. The three cases can be
considered as follows:
• In the ring case, the operation As over Zq is a representation of the ring operation a · s
in Rq ∼= Zq[X]/(XN + 1). Using the CRT decomposition in dimension N of [41], this
operation is decomposed into coordinatewise multiplication in a vector of dimension N over
Zq, following which the decomposition is reversed to recover a · s. The complexity of this
technique is dominated by that of the CRT decomposition, which takes time O(N logN),
although the coordinatewise multiplication also requires time O(N).
• In the module case, A is a d×d matrix over Rq. In this case, one can compute As by applying
the CRT in dimension n coordinatewise on A and s. This requires d2 + d applications of
the CRT, for a total asymptotic complexity of O(d2n log n) = O(Nd log(N/d)). Again, this
hides a coordinatewise multiplication step which takes time O(Nd) in this setting.
• In the cyclic algebra case, A is a matrix in the shape φ(a), where φ(a) is the left regular
representation of a ∈ Λq. We estimate the complexity of the operation φ(a) · s in Appendix
G. Explicitly, our algorithm has complexity O(N log(N/d2))+O(Ndω−2) in the case where
q splits completely in L, with ω ∈ [2, 2.373] denoting the exponent of matrix multiplication.
The latter term corresponds to the cost of multiplication in our analog of the finite fields
used in the CRT method for RLWE.
We see that cyclic algebras compare favourably with modules for multiplication in the same
dimension N , depending on the exact relationship between log d2 and dω−2. Since d is likely to
be fixed while n scales up, we expect that the O(N logN) term will dominate the complexity.
Nonetheless, we include the second term in our results to quantify our claims. The second term
O(Ndω−2) becomes O(Nd) with naive matrix multiplication instead of the algorithms of [13],
yet its overall multiplication complexity is still lower than that of module multiplication in the
same dimension.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The primary goal of this work is the introduction of the Learning with Errors problem
over Cyclic Algebras, CLWE, adding to the family of available LWE assumptions for use in
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cryptography. To this end, the central pillars of an LWE problem are provided for the cyclic
algebra case. First, in order to provide a foundation for the construction the notion of lattices
derived from ideals of the natural order of a cyclic algebra are applied in cryptography for the first
time. Then, in Section III, the CLWE problem is formally introduced, following which explicit
algebras are provided with dimensions and structure appropriate for cryptographic use. Then,
in Section IV, the usual LWE security reductions are established in the CLWE case: namely,
the problem of solving short vector problems on order-ideal lattices is reduced to the search
CLWE problem, and then a variant of the search CLWE problem where the secret is restricted
to a fixed, well constructed subset of its usual space is reduced to the decision CLWE problem.
Under plausible assumptions on this restricted search problem, combining these two reductions
gives the necessary security grounding for CLWE based cryptography, which is that samples
from the CLWE distribution appear pseudorandom to an onlooker with no knowledge of the
secret s. Finally, in Section V, the necessary steps are taken to mold the CLWE problem into a
practical format for cryptography. Normal form reduction is shown and a sample cryptosystem
in this form is provided. Additionally, the complexity of operations in CLWE cryptography is
compared to that of RLWE and MLWE based schemes.
Cyclic algebras exhibit substantial novel structures within lattice-based cryptography, and
discovering use cases for these previously unseen features represents an exciting area of future
research. We outline a few directions of future research in the following.
From a theoretical standpoint, the most pressing question to be solved about CLWE is whether
or not the search and decision problem are polynomial time equivalent, or instead if the hardness
of the decision variant can be based directly on hard lattice problems via some other technique.
In this work, the hardness of the decision problem for arbitrary secret is shown to derive from
the assumed hardness of a variant of the search problem where the secret is restricted to lie
in any so-called pairwise difference set G. Although this substantially lowers the size of the
secret space, the resulting secret space is still far too large to exhaustively search. Furthermore,
the decision problem is as hard as the search problem for the hardest choice of decision set G,
precluding particularly easy cases. Nonetheless, this does not establish the formal hardness of
the decision CLWE problem based on the lattice problems of Section II-E. The reduction fails
to permit arbitrary secret since the decomposition into matrix rings of Lemma 12 results in a
problem that can not be ‘guessed’ effectively, since the oracle does not necessarily accept inputs
as valid when the guess is wrong.
Another method of establishing the hardness of decision RLWE that is not shown for CLWE
in this work is a direct to decision reduction, which more generally represents a security proof
for the decision problem that holds for wider classes of cyclic division algebras than those of
Section IV-B. The direct to decision reduction of [34] is the only security reduction for RLWE
which establishes the hardness of the decision problem without enforcing that K is a cyclotomic
field within which q splits completely, as in the search-decision reduction of [2] and the presented
analog for CLWE. Dropping this restriction, and hence widening the possible choices of cyclic
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algebras supporting the hardness of the decision problem, would provide larger design space for
CLWE based cryptography.
As for another direction of future work, we view a drawback of our work to be that we are
restricted to certain instances of cyclic algebras. Although in practice most cryptography would
use a fixed choice of algebra, this is a function of our methods and may be possible to remove.
Additionally, showing the aforementioned direct-to-decision reduction may generalize the choice
of algebras.
Finally, this work is focused on the theoretical construction of a non-commutative Ring-LWE
assumption, and we leave practical analysis and implementation of cryptography based on CLWE
as further research.
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APPENDIX A
ATTACKING NON-DIVISION ALGEBRAS
In Section III-A, the condition that γ is a non-norm element of L/K is required in order to
stop parallelizing attacks in the style of that of [22] applying to the CLWE problem. Thus, γ
is chosen so that γi is not in the norm group of L into K for i = 1, 2, . . . , d − 1. Here, we
demonstrate that picking γ that violates this condition leads to potentially vulnerable instances
of the CLWE problem. We will need the following lemma, a rephrasing of [35, Theorem 30.4].
Lemma 22. Let A = (L/K, θ, γ) be a cyclic algebra with [L : K] = d. Let γ, δ ∈ K be
non-zero. Then
• A ∼= Ai := (L/K, θi, γi) for each i such that (i, d) = 1.
• If γ = 1 then A ∼= Md×d(K).
• If δ = NL/K(β)γ for some non-zero β ∈ L then A ∼= A′ := (L/K, θ, δ).
Remark 12. If γ ∈ OK is a unit then all isomorphisms of this lemma hold when replacing L
and K with OL and OK respectively. The first and third can be seen by examining the proofs
in [35]; the first is a re-indexing of u coordinates of A, and the third simply sends u to βu. The
second requires a little more work. We map A to HomK(L,L) by sending u to θ and x ∈ L
to the K-homomorphism on L defined by multiplying by x. Finally, we appeal to the standard
isomorphism between HomK(L,L) and Md×d(K), which preserves integral elements as long as
there exists an integral basis of L over K. We discuss the details of this last part later, because
we also require it to preserve a notion of smallness.
Armed with this lemma, we demonstrate potential weaknesses of choosing γ poorly. Let
A = (L/K, θ, γ) be a cyclic algebra where γ lies in the norm group NL/K(L×) (and still lies
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in OK); later we will generalize our argument to the case where instead some power of γ less
than d is a norm instead. Consider the primal CLWE instance (a, a · s + e) ∈ Λq × Λq, where
a, s are uniform7 and e ← χ is drawn from an error distribution which is of Gaussian shape.
Applying Lemma 22 transforms our sample into one over Md×d(OKq) ×Md×d(OKq). That is,
we construct a sample in the form
(A,A · S + E)
where A,S,E ∈Md×d(OKq). Since isomorphisms are bijections, A and S are uniformly random
matrices. Assume for the time being that the isomorphisms are also smallness preserving, so that
if e is a small element of Λq then the corresponding matrix E will have entries that are small
elements of OK .
Let si, ei denote the ith columns of S and E respectively. Then, for each i the pair (A,Asi+ei)
constitutes d samples from the MLWE distribution in dimension n and rank d. That is, the single
CLWE sample provides a collection of d samples from d instances of the MLWE distribution with
different secrets s1, . . . , sd, where each set of samples shares the same uniformly random matrix
A. Since the difficulty of LWE problems is assumed to be superlinear in dimension N , solving
d instances of the MLWE problem in dimension n and module rank d is easier than solving
a single instance in dimension nd and rank d, the targeted dimension of our CLWE problem,
which is essentially the parallelizing argument of the attack of [22] on m-RLWE. Furthermore,
the matrix A being common to each set of samples potentially weakens the resulting MLWE
instances. Thus, assuming that ei is suitably distributed, it is clear that choosing a γ that is the
norm of an element of L compromises security.
We are left to consider the distribution of the error matrix E. In order to understand this, we
must discuss the proof of Lemma 22 further. Let γ = NL/K(β), so that the isomorphism mapping
A to A′ = (L/K, θ, 1) fixes L and sends u to uβ. Following the proof of Theorem 2 we see
that the γ which are both roots of unity and norm elements are precisely norms of some other
root of unity. Hence, β is a root of unity and this isomorphism maps a Gaussian distribution on
A to a Gaussian distribution on A′.
The isomorphism mapping A′ to Md×d(K) begins with a mapping from A′ to HomK(L,L)
that sends x ∈ L to the multiplication function fx(y) = xy for y ∈ L and sends u to θ. Then, it
applies the well known isomorphism sending HomK(L,L) to Md×d(K), which can be defined
constructively as follows:
• Fix a K-basis {`1, . . . , `d} of L over K.
• Define fj : K → L as fj(x) = `jx, a mapping onto the j coordinate of the basis.
• Let pij : L→ K denote the projection map onto the `j sending pij(
∑d
i=1 xi`i) = `j .
• Define ∆ : HomK(L,L)→Md×d(K) coordinatewise as ∆(ψ)i,j = (pii ◦ ψ ◦ fj)(1).
7In practice s is typically sampled from the error distribution, but this normal form variant is no easier than the case where
s is uniform. We assume uniform s here for ease of illustration.
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Since it permits an arbitrary choice of K-basis, this isomorphism is non-unique. Furthermore,
an attacker trying to apply this isomorphism would be able to use their choice of basis and
still compute the isomorphism efficiently. We are interested in the image of a Gaussian sample
e ∈ Λq under this isomorphism, with e =
∑d−1
i=0 u
iei, having each ei sampled independently
from a discrete Gaussian over OLq, being sent to ψe =
∑d−1
i=0 e
′
iσ
i. Correspondingly, the i, j
coordinate of the matrix E = ∆(e) is
pii(
d−1∑
k=0
ekθ
k(`j)).
For the j th column of E (the error vector in the set of d MLWE samples with secret si), the
error is precisely the `i coordinate of
∑d−1
k=0 ekθ
k(`j).
Now the distribution of the error in each collection of MLWE samples depends on the
properties of the chosen basis. Since the ek are independent Gaussian samples from L, j is fixed
and θ represents a permutation of the canonical embedding coordinates of L elements. Hence,∑d−1
k=0 ekθ
k(`j) is an elliptical Gaussian with n blocks of d different parameters. Furthermore, if
{`1, . . . , `d} is a cyclic basis then, since the distribution of ‖σL(`k)‖2 is independent of k, the
projection pii(
∑d−1
k=0 ekθ
k(`j)) follows an elliptical Gaussian. In addition, these coordinates are
not independent and are potentially highly correlated.
The end result of this exposition is that, depending on the properties of the cyclic bases of L/K
and given the choice of γ as a norm element, from a single CLWE instance we can construct
d parallel copies of d MLWE instances in dimension n and rank d with correlated error. These
correlated instances of the MLWE problem are plausibly substantially easier than the claimed
security of the CLWE instance, which is that it is roughly as hard as an MLWE instance in
the same dimension nd and rank d. Of course, the error distributions in the underlying MLWE
instances are non-standard and we have not presented a concrete attack on them. Instead, we
believe this discussion is sufficient to persuade the unconvinced reader that solving the CLWE
problem with norm element γ can be simplified by some parallelization into MLWE instances,
and thus we should stick to our specification that γ is a norm.
In the above exposition we restricted ourselves to cases where γ is a norm, but the definition
of the non-norm condition also precludes γ as valid if and only if γi is a norm for some i < d
that is coprime with d (see [7]). However, we have previously assumed that the hardness of
the CLWE problem was independent of the choice of primitive nth root. In the constructions of
Theorem 2 γ is an nth root of unity and d divides the prime power n, so if i is coprime with
d then i is also coprime with n and so γi is a primitive root which defines a cyclic algebra
in which the CLWE problem can be parallelized. Thus, we conclude that γ must satisfy the
non-norm condition rather than just itself not be a norm. Independently, a recent work [21]
revisiting m-RLWE observes that the underlying property causing the attacks of [22] on the
original instantiations was the presence of zero-divisors in the ambient space. In our case, zero-
divisors exist in a cyclic algebra if and only if the non-norm condition is not satisfied, so their
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argument should preclude not just the γ that are themselves norms but also all γ which fail the
non-norm condition.
APPENDIX B
IMPOSSIBLE ALGEBRAS
We show that certain algebras that would otherwise be what we are looking for do not exist
under our restrictions. As discussed above we would like to begin with a base field that is
cyclotomic, K = Q(ζm) for integer m, and proceed to fix some low degree cyclic Galois
extension L/K and non-norm element γ ∈ OK with |γ| = 1 e.g. γ is a root of unity. Given
these restrictions and the shape of lattice cryptography, the most natural fields to look for are
low degree extensions of two-power cyclotomics e.g. m = 2k. Unfortunately, we are able to
prove the non-existence of a large class of such extensions.
Theorem 7. Let K = Q(ζm) for some positive integer m and let p ≥ 2 be some integer which
is coprime with m. Then, for any Galois extension L/K of degree p each ζm, ζ2m, . . . , ζ
m−1
m lies
in NL/K(K×).
Proof. Since L/K is a Galois extension of degree p, the relative norm map NL/K(·) induces the
map x→ xp on elements x ∈ K×. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 be an integer; we will prove the theorem
by finding 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1 such that NL/K(ζjm) = ζ im. Since ζm and its powers lie in K, the
relative norm map takes ζjm to ζ
jp
m and we are left to solve the congruence jp ≡ i mod m. By
assumption, g.c.d.(m, p) = 1 and so p is invertible modulo m. Denoting this inverse p−1 and
letting j = p−1i mod m it is easy to see that jp ≡ ip−1p ≡ i mod m. The theorem statement
follows immediately.
This theorem precludes the existence of a very large class of cyclic division algebras with
cyclotomic base field. In particular, if the degree of [L : K] is coprime with m then we can not
have our restrictions that |γ| = 1, is integral, and that K is cyclotomic. We draw attention to the
specific classes whose non-existence we are interested in: in an ideal world we might instantiate
CLWE with K = Q(ζ2k) and [L : K] = d for arbitrary small integer d corresponding to the
module rank, which in practice is likely to be at most say 5. However, as a result of Theorem 7
we know that d can not be coprime with 2k and must be even in order to permit a suitable γ,
from which it follows that we can not have d = 3, 5.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Before proving Theorem 3 we need some additional concepts and a Lemma. Given a K-central
division algebra A and some OK order Λ in it, then the OK-discriminant of Λ, d(Λ/OK),
is a certain ideal in OK [35, p.126]. While A has many maximal orders they all share the
same discriminant, which is called the discriminant of the algebra dA. Now the key fact about
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discriminants we need is that an order Λ is maximal if and only it’s discriminant equals that of
dA.
We will now use the notation of Section III-C. According to [25] the field L and therefore
also its subfield M are subfields of Q(ζm, ζq′), where m = pa, and q′ 6= p is some large prime.
Let n = ϕ(m) = pa−1(p − 1). Furthermore it is known that q′ splits completely in the field
K = Q(ζm). Let us now denote with
q′OK = q′1 · · · q′n,
the prime ideal decomposition of q′ in K. We then have the following result.
Lemma 23. Let (M/K, θ, ζm) be an index d division algebra of Theorem 2 and let Λ be the
corresponding natural order. Then we have that
d(Λ/OK) = (q′1, · · · q′n)d(d−1). (2)
Proof. According to [7, Lemma 5.4] we have that
d(Λ/OK) = d(M/K)dζd(d−1)m = d(M/K)d,
where d(M/K) is the relative number field discriminant of the extension M/K. In order to find
the discriminant of the natural order, it is now enough to find d(M/K). By the basic theory
of cyclotomic fields we know that Q(ζm, ζq′) = Q(ζmq′). We also know that the only ramified
primes in the extension Q(ζmq′)/Q are p and q′ and their ramification indices are e1 = n and
e2 = q
′ − 1, respectively. Furthermore ramification index of p in the extension Q(ζm)/Q is e1.
As ramification indices are multiplicative in towers of extensions we can deduce that the only
primes that are possibly ramified in the extension Q(ζmq′)/Q(ζm) are those that lie above q′
in the ring OK . As q′ is not ramified in Q(ζm), we get again by the multiplicativity of the
ramification indices that all the primes q′i are totally ramified in the extension Q(ζmq′)/Q(ζm).
Therefore they are also totally ramified in the extension M/Q(ζm). Because q′ does not divide
d the prime ideals q′i are tamely ramified. Dedekind’s discriminant theorem now imply that
d(M/K) = (q′1 · · · q′n)(d−1).
Now we are ready to prove the natural order in Theorem 3 is actually maximal.
Proof. The proof is based on the result in [35] that states that an order is maximal if and only
if it has the same discriminant as the discriminant of the algebra. According to Lemma 23 we
have that
d(Λ/OK) = d(M/K)d = (q′1 · · · q′n)d(d−1). (3)
According to [35] the discriminant of the maximal order will always divide the discriminant
of the natural order. Hence we know that the only prime ideals that can possibly divide the
discriminant of the maximal order are q′i. Let us now assume that Qi is prime ideal above q
′
i in
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L. By abusing notation we will denote with Lq′i the Qi-adic completion of L and in the same
way the respective completion Mq′i .
Following the proof of [25, Theorem 4] we can see that the authors actually prove that ζm is
a non-norm element in the extension Lq′i/Kq′i for each prime ideal q
′
i. Using the same proof as
in Theorem 2 we can now see that ζm is a non-norm element in the extensions Mq′i/Kq′i , for all
i. According to [35, Theorem 30.8] A⊗KKq′i ∼= (Mq′i/Kq′i , θ′, ζm), where θ′ naturally extends θ.
As ζm is a non-norm element, (Mq′i/Kq′i , θ
′, ζm) is an index d division algebra. By definition of
the local index we can see that the local indices mq′i are d for all q
′
i. We now know that q
′
i are
the only possible primes dividing the discriminant and that their local indices are d. According
to [35, Theorem 32.1] the discriminant of the algebra A is
dA =
n∏
i=1
q′
(mq′
i
−1) d2
m
q′
i
i =
n∏
i=1
q′(d−1)di ,
completing the proof.
APPENDIX D
CONSTRUCTIONS USING COMPOSITUM FIELDS
Our other method for constructing suitable extensions starts from extensions which are nearly
what we are looking for and applies field compositums (cf. [35, Chapter 30]). We recommend
this method to build on top of fields constructed using either Theorem 1 or Theorem 2. Say
we have a Galois field extension L′/K ′ with non-norm element γ ∈ OK′ whose Galois group
is cyclic of degree d. Let F be some other Galois number field with F ∩ L′ = Q. Then
Gal(L′F/K ′F ) ∼= Gal(L′/K ′) and γ is a non-norm element in L′F/K ′F . Relabelling this
extension as L/K and letting θ denote the cyclic generator of the Galois group gives a cyclic
field extension with non-norm γ such that [L : K] = d and [K : Q] = [K ′ : Q] · [F : Q]. The
relations among these fields are illustrated in Fig. 4(a).
One can generalize this method to the case where the base field can not be written conveniently
as a compositum of two fields. Let L′/K ′ be a cyclic Galois extension of degree d with non-
norm element γ and let K be another Galois number field which contains K ′. Then KL′/K is
a cyclic Galois extension of degree k for some k dividing d, and in particular if K ∩ L′ = K ′
then k = d since the fields are linearly disjoint above K ′. See Fig. 4(b) for the relations among
these fields.
We give example algebras of dimensions 576, 768 and 1152 in Table I with less restrictive
dimension using field compositum techniques. We propose two alternate methods of applying
field compositums in Fig. 4(a): either use Theorem 2 to make an algebra which already has large
dimension by selecting large center K and small extension L, then compose a small field F
onto K and L to tweak the total dimension. Alternatively, one can create algebras by selecting
small fields L and K using Theorem 1 and composing both with a large field F .
We begin with an example of the first method that achieves dimension 768. Let L′ be a degree
two extension of the field K ′ = Q(ζ64) chosen by Theorem 2 with non-norm root of unity γ, so
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Fig. 4: Constructions using field compositums: (a) base field K is a compositum K ′F , (b) K
cannot be written as a compositum.
that the corresponding algebra A′ has dimension 128. Compose both L′ and K ′ with the field
F = Q(ζ9), denoting the compositums by L and K respectively. Then γ is still a non-norm
element in the extension L/K, a degree two extension that is cyclic and Galois, and the algebra
A = (L/K, θ, γ) is a cyclic algebra of dimension 6× 128 = 768, as required. We observe that
here the center K corresponds to the fields with fast operations used in [42].
Our final method of composing large degree fields onto small degree extensions is aimed at
targeting odd module ranks. Begin by choosing the desired module rank d as a (likely small)
odd prime. Then set K ′ = Q(ζd) and pick L′ as a cyclic Galois extension of K ′ in which the
dth root of unity is a non-norm element using Theorem 1. Let F := Q(ζ2k) and again let L
and K denote its compositum with L′ and K ′ respectively. Then A = (L/K, θ, γ) is a cyclic
algebra with n := [K : Q] = (d − 1)2k−1 and d = [L : K] a small prime. The form of the
total dimension N = d2(d − 1)2k−1 constrains our choice of dimension, but for examples of
cryptographically relevant sizes with d = 3 one can consider setting k = 6 or k = 7 to achieve
dimension N = 576 or N = 1152 respectively. If one required additional flexibility of dimension
one could also consider increasing d or replacing the power-of-two cyclotomic field with any
cyclotomic field whose intersection with Q(ζd) is precisely Q. This method comes with the
subtle drawback that the module rank d is also present in the dimension of the base field K,
which precludes the case where one wants a large module rank and a small center. On the other
hand, since such cases are excluded in our security proof we view this drawback as minor.
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APPENDIX E
EXTENSIONS WHERE q SPLITS COMPLETELY IN L
We would like q to be of roughly appropriate cryptographic size (say between 3000 and 15000
as a soft estimate, once again presuming parameters similar to those of NewHope or KYBER).
Having q split completely in L is not as straightforward as in K because L is not a cyclotomic
field, so we return to our examination of the proof of Theorem 1. Recall that in this proof the
extension field L is a subfield of K(ζmq′) for some prime integer q′ satisfying q′ = 1 mod m
and, for m = pa, pa+1 does not divide q′ − 1. That is, a is the highest power of p that divides
q′− 1. We have several methods to ensure that q splits completely in L, of which we start with
the most naive.
1) Naive Method: For our general method we rely on the following fact: If qi is an ideal of
OK which splits completely in an extension M/K then it splits completely in any intermediate
field M/L/K. As it is conceptually simpler to apply this idea to the integer q than to the OK-
ideals qi we use a simpler statement, that if 〈q〉 splits completely in some M containing L then
it splits completely in L. This gives us an easy way to find some q that splits completely by
examining a cyclotomic field that contains L: let K = Q(ζm) and let M = K(ζq′). Then since
q′ = 1 mod m it follows that M = Q(ζmq′). Thus q splits completely in M if and only if q = 1
mod mq′ and consequentially splits completely in our extension L if q = 1 mod mq′. Since
there are infinitely many primes equal to 1 mod mq′ this recipe always provides a prime q that
splits completely in L. The upside of this method is that it is both very general and simple,
since all candidate fields L we construct are contained in a larger cyclotomic field. Theoretically,
this method can be extended to any abelian extension of Q using the partial converse of the
Kronecker-Weber Theorem. However, using the Kronecker-Weber Theorem constructively is not
as straightforward as picking q′ as in the proof of Theorem 1, so this extension to general abelian
L is slightly contrived.
The downside to this method is that it seems that often this will result in unrealistically large
q. Since q′ = 1 mod m and not 1 mod pa+1, q′ must be chosen carefully and there are not
many ‘small’ primes satisfying these conditions. For example, in our quadratic extension case
with m = 512 the smallest prime that is 1 mod m but not 1 mod 2m is q′ = 7681. The
smallest q which is 1 mod (512 · 7681) has to be bigger than 512 · 7681 = 3932672, which
is inappropriately large for lattice cryptography. Of course, one could be lucky here and have
much smaller q for different choices of L and K, but in general we regard this as a theoretical
result rather than a practical method. Even for smaller 2-power cases such as m = 128 one must
set q′ = 641, which leads to a smallest valid prime of q = 820481.
Remarkably, this is much less bad in the cubic case; K = Q(ζ81) gives q′ = 163 as a suitable
prime and q = 26407 still splits completely. This is perhaps slightly too large, but certainly not
so much so that it is completely impractical. Nonetheless, we move on to a better method for
quadratic cases.
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2) Quadratic Case: In the case where L/K (K = Q(ζ512)) is a quadratic extension we are able
to choose substantially smaller q by examining the unique quadratic subfields of E ′ := Q(ζq′).
We rewrite M as the compositum of E ′ and K, and observe that since our chosen L contains
K our method of choosing L as a subfield of M allows us to write L = EK for a subfield E
of E ′. In the case where L is a degree two extension of K we know that E is a quadratic field,
and since E ′ is a prime cyclotomic field we have an explicit description for its unique quadratic
subfield E; namely that E = Q(
√
q′) if q′ = 1 mod 4 and E = Q(
√−q′) is q′ = 3 mod 4.
It is a standard fact that the discriminant dE of E is q′ if q′ = 1 mod 4 and −q′ otherwise.
Finally, we know that a prime q splits completely in E if and only if the congruence dE = x2
mod q has a solution e.g. if dE is a square mod q. Plugging in the prime numbers q = 12289 and
q′ = 7681 that are common in cryptography we see that q′ = 1 mod 4 and that 7681 = 37882
mod 12289, so that q = 12289 splits completely in E,K, and thus L, as required. Since this
prime is explicitly the prime used in NewHope for all parameter sets we view this method as a
substantial improvement on the previous technique.
3) Quartic Fields: Again, we use the method of describing L as a compositum MK/K. Now,
M will be a quartic subfield of the field Q(ζq′) and one can establish the linearly disjoint nature
of M and K required to express L as this compositum by e.g. examining their discriminants:
since K is a power-of-two cyclotomic field the only prime appearing in its discriminant is 2, and
since M is a subfield of Q(ζq′) the only prime in its discriminant is q′. Since they have coprime
discriminants they are linearly disjoint, and since ramified primes are factors of the discriminant
we have a relatively easy way to discount q being ramified (q 6= 2, q′), so the remaining case to
concern ourselves with is q being inert.
Since the discriminants are coprime we have a method for explicitly describing the integral
basis of L = MK; the integral basis for K is clear, and an integral basis for M in fixed dimension
can be computed relatively easily since it has degree 4. Then, the product of their integral bases
is an integral basis for L. Now one only needs to check whether q splits completely in M , since
splitting in K is well understood. We are unable to provide a general method for finding such
q, but an easy computation reveals that for q = 10753 and K = Q(ζ256) there is a quartic field
M such that q splits completely in M and K and hence L. Since we have a relatively small
range in which we wish to place q and M has low degree we do not consider the cost of this
search as a large drawback since it can be done efficiently on computational software such as
SAGE or PARI.
Remark 13. In fact, this quartic method can be applied to other instances where we do not
have an explicit description of the subfields of K(ζq′) which have degree d over K: define the
families of q which split completely in K, then check whether those q split completely in L using
computational software. Since q = 1 mod m and m is relatively large, there will not be many
q to check of appropriate size for lattice cryptography, and so we conclude that this method is
sufficient for fixed choices of fields L,K for which a satisfactory q exists.
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APPENDIX F
RESTRICTING THE SECRET SPACE
In Lemma 14 we need to use a fact that is implicit in the search-decision reduction of [2]: for
uniformly random v ∈ Ri and an incorrect guess g of the secret s modulo Ri, the distribution
of v(g− s) is uniformly random. In the ring and module cases, the secret space is decomposed
into a direct product of finite fields, so it is clear that v(g − s) is uniformly random in each
finite field for g 6= s.
In our case, an appeal to Wedderburn’s theorem demonstrates that, since for our parameter
choices each Ri is a central simple algebra over OK∨/qiOK∨ ∼= Fq, each Ri is isomorphic to the
full matrix ring Md×d(Fq), for which it is not true in general that v(g− s) is uniformly random
for g 6= s; in fact, it is uniformly random if and only if g − s is invertible. Thus we restrict our
secret s so that s mod Ri lies in a set Gi with the property that g 6= h ∈ Gi implies g−h is an
invertible matrix. Applying this restriction for each i places s ∈ G for a set G = G1× · · · ×Gn
of size |G| = ∏i |Gi|. Now, an incorrect guess g ∈ Gi of s mod Ri results in a distribution of
v(g − s) which is uniformly random mod Ri. We will call such a set G a pairwise difference
set.
We also need to guarantee that there exist sufficiently large choices of G. A simple method
for constructing a valid Gi is by fixing some arbitrary embedding β of Fqd into Mn×n(Fq) and
letting Gi equal the image of this embedding, such that |Gi| = qd and |G| = qnd. Indeed, a
Gi constructed in this way is maximal because any set of matrices in Md×d(Fq) of size at least
qd + 1 contains two matrices with the same first row, whose difference is therefore uninvertible.
There are a number of choices of embedding β, and thus set Gi, equal to the number of
irreducible polynomials of degree d in Fq[x], which can be calculated by the Necklace polynomial
and in general will vastly exceed q. We make clear that our reduction will take the decision
CLWE problem for arbitrary secret s to the search CLWE problem where s ∈ G for arbitrary
fixed G, which we denote by CLWEq,Σα,G. Thus, our reduction states that the decision problem
is as hard as the search problem for the hardest choice of G, precluding obvious attacks on the
unique case where G = OLq∨ and the CLWE problem with s ∈ G corresponds to d parallel
copies in L of the RLWE problem8. For a general set G, s ∈ G will not provide parallelization
since they need not have the property of L that they are entirely contained in one u coordinate
of A. Additionally, even though elements of G constructed this way co-commute, they do not lie
in the center of Λ and the multiplication a · s in the CLWE instance will not be a commutative
operation.
Of course, fixing a G of size qnd restricts the size of the secret space by a factor of q
nd
qnd2
, a
substantial loss in size even for fixed, small d. For concrete parameter settings, this may result
in a much easier problem, but asymptotically it is still exponential in n and thus establishes a
suitable hardness property for decision CLWE. Of course, attacks based on exhaustive search are
8Although this case exists only when each qiOL is a prime ideal in OL.
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unlikely to represent the best attacks on the CLWE problem, so this may or may not substantially
aid an attacker in practice.
In fact, there is no a priori reason why Gi should be a field, or even closed under multiplication.
For example, fixing a pair of invertible matrices M1,M2 and replacing Gi with M1 ·Gi ·M2 =
{M1XM2|X ∈ Gi} results in a new set of size qd whose pairwise differences are all invertible
but is not multiplicatively closed in general. Although the field embedding technique is perhaps
the most elegant way of building Gi, and certainly the most constructive, it may transpire that
taking s from some set with less algebraic structure is advantageous in terms of the hardness
of the resulting search problem. One can also construct the valid set Gi +X by adding a fixed
matrix X to each element of Gi, but this technique is somewhat constrained by the fact that
LWE samples are additive in the secret s (e.g. one could just add a ·X into the second coordinate
of the resulting samples).
Although this restriction is not ideal, we have a remark about the implications on the security
of the CLWE problem. Restricting the secret space in (R)LWE problems is not an uncommon
idea: tertiary secrets, where each coordinate of s ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, are used in the NIST candidate
LAC [43] amongst others, and security whilst restricting the secret to orders or subfields is
discussed in [44], and to other K-lattices in [45]. Overall, we suspect that the decision CLWE
problem is polynomial time equivalent to the search CLWE problem without restriction on s,
in particular when the number of samples is small as in our applications in Section V, and
that the restriction is a function of our reduction technique rather than some causal property of
the CLWE distribution. For the purposes of constructing a cryptosystem, we assume that this
reduction implies that the decision CLWE problem is hard.
APPENDIX G
ESTIMATING THE MULTIPLICATION COMPLEXITY
The overall flow to compute the multiplication is depicted in Fig. 5, which is explained in
detail in the sequel.
A. Algorithm for Multiplication in Cyclic Algebras
We recall some details necessary to understand our multiplication algorithm. Recall that in
the explicit constructions of Theorem 2 the base field K is cyclotomic and q is a prime integer
chosen so that 〈q〉 splits completely in OK as 〈q〉 = q1 . . . qn, where n is the dimension of K as
an extension of Q. Furthermore, the degree of L over K is a typically small d. Then, following
the CRT-like decomposition of Lemma 12 we write
Λq ∼= R1 × · · · × Rn
for Ri =
⊕d−1
j=0 u
jOL/qiOL. We will show that each Ri is a skew polynomial ring over Zq, and
in particular a skew polynomial ring for which we can apply the algorithms of [13] to compute
multiplication independently in each Ri in O(dω) operations in Zq, which output elements whose
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𝑎, 𝑠 ∈ Λ𝑞
𝑎1, 𝑠1 ∈ 𝓡1
𝑎2, 𝑠2 ∈ 𝓡2
𝑎𝑛, 𝑠𝑛 ∈ 𝓡𝑛
[CLB17]
⋮
[CLB17]
[CLB17]
𝑎1 ⋅ 𝑠1 ∈ 𝓡1
𝑎2 ⋅ 𝑠2 ∈ 𝓡2
𝑎𝑛 ⋅ 𝑠𝑛 ∈ 𝓡𝑛
⋮ ⋮ 𝑎 ⋅ 𝑠 ∈ Λ𝑞
CRT-Like
Split
Input Skew 
Polynomials
Output Skew 
Polynomials
CRT-Like
Recombine
Fig. 5: Depiction of the multiplication algorithm for cyclic algebras. [CLB17] is referred to as
[13].
u coordinates are in the form
∑
i `iki for ki ∈ OKq and {`i} some arbitrary normal basis for
OLq over OKq. We remark that the representation as a skew polynomial ring need not contradict
the fact that we viewed the rings Ri as matrix rings in Section IV-B, since computing matrix
multiplication can be reduced to the problem of computing multiplication of skew polynomials
(see [13]). Since ω ≤ 2.373 and we can compute the multiplication in each Ri in parallel,
this leads to a complexity of approximately O(Nd0.373). However, we must also compute the
complexity of the splitting isomorphism.
B. The Rings Ri
In order to apply the algorithm of [13], we must confirm that each Ri satisfies the following
conditions:
• Ri is the quotient of a skew polynomial ring with center OK/qi by a polynomial in the
form Xd − γ.
• γ is a norm from OL/qiOL into OK/qi.9
• OL/qiOL is a field extension of OK/qi or an e´tale-OK/qi algebra.
9Due to the modulo reduction this does not contradict the assumption that γ is not a global norm.
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The first of the conditions follows immediately from the definitions of a skew polynomial ring
and a cyclic algebra. The veracity of the latter conditions will depend on how the prime ideal
qi of OK splits in OL as qiOL. Since qi is prime in K and L/K is Galois, we know
qiOL =
g∏
j=1
(qi,j)
e
for some prime ideals qi,j in OL and integers e, g satisfying efg = [L : K] = d, where f
denotes the inertial degree. Assuming that L is constructed as a subfield of a cyclotomic field
as in [25], it is a Galois number field and it follows that each qi splits with the same e, f, and
g. Furthermore, since they are coprime as ideals of OK , their factorizations’ in L are disjoint.
Thus, we are left to consider three cases.
We first consider the case where each qiOL remains prime in OL. It follows that OL/qiOL is
a finite field, and computing the norm of qiOL indicates OL/qiOL ∼= Fqd . In this case it is easy
to see that OL/qiOL is a finite field extension of OK/qi ∼= Fq and consequentially, because the
norm map is surjective over finite field extensions, that γ is a norm. Here it is clear that the
algorithms of [13] can be applied.
The second case we consider is g = d, e = f = 1. Now each qiOL splits completely in OL
into a product of prime ideals qi,1 . . . qi,d. By the CRT we have
OL/qiOL ∼=
d⊗
j=1
OL/qi,j
where each OL/qi,j ∼= Fq, and it follows that OL/qiOL is an e´tale-OK/qi algebra. We are left
to show that γ is a norm, which we show via the stronger condition that the norm map in this
extension is surjective. By the CRT, OL/qiOL is isomorphic to a direct product of d copies of Fq.
Since the embeddings of L cyclically permute the ideal factors of qi it follows that the relative
norm of an element (x1, . . . , xd) ∈
⊗d
j=0OL/qi,j is precisely
∏d
k=1 xk mod q. It is easy to see
that this norm is surjective (because any x ∈ Fq is the norm of e.g. (1, 1, . . . , x)) and now once
again we can apply the multiplication algorithms of [13].
Intermediate cases, where qi splits into a product of prime ideals with the same norm such
that e = 1, fg = d, can be handled using a straightforward combination of these two methods.
The final case to consider is the ramified case, when e 6= 1. Now the factorization of qiOL
contains some power peii of a prime OL ideal pi. In this case, we are not able to verify that
the necessary conditions for the algorithms of [13] hold. However, we observe that the ideal
〈q〉 ramifies in OL if and only if q divides the discriminant of OL. Since only a finite number
of primes divide this discriminant, we restrict ourselves to considering the cases where q does
not ramify. We emphasize that in the main cases of interest, where K is the mth cyclotomic
field with m having small divisors and [L : K] is small, it is particularly unlikely that the large
modulus q typical in cryptography divides the discriminant of L. Indeed, when we pick L as a
subfield of K(ζq′) for some large prime integer s using the techniques of [25] as in Theorem 2,
it is easy to quantify which primes potentially ramify for a fixed choice of fields: either s or the
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primes smaller than or equal to the divisors of m. As an easy example, the modulus q = 12289
does not ramify in the example algebras given in the Section III-D achieving dimension 1024.
C. Complexity of the CRT Style Isomorphism
We have shown that we may apply the algorithms of [13] to compute the multiplication
operation in each Ri in complexity O(dω). We are left to consider the complexity of the
isomorphism defined by Lemma 12 generating the rings Ri. Essentially, this operation is a
coordinatewise split of the u coordinates of Λq =
⊕d−1
j=0 u
jOL, where each entry is split into its
mod qiOL parts. That is, the isomorphism maps
d−1∑
j=0
ujxj →
n⊗
i=1
d−1∑
j=0
uj(xj mod qiOL).
Splitting one element xi ∈ OK can be done in time O(n log n) using the CRT algorithm of
[41] when K is a cyclotomic field of dimension n. However, L is a not a cyclotomic field,
but instead a small degree d cyclic extension of a cyclotomic. Furthermore, we are trying to
split the elements of L modulo ideals of K extended to those of L. We do not know of an
existing general, efficient way of doing this. The naive estimate for an optimal method would
take time O(nd log nd), where nd is the dimension of L, but we suspect something this efficient
is impossible. We have to perform d such splits, which would result in a total complexity
of O(N logN/d). Note that this compares relatively closely with the O(Nd0.3) claimed for
the multiplication step, and since these steps are sequential rather than parallel which of them
dominates the asymptotic complexity would depend on the exact relationship between n and d,
but the result is an operational complexity essentially equivalent to that of the ring variant.
Of course, the discussion of the previous paragraph relies on our implausibly low estimate of
O(nd log nd) complexity of the CRT split and so we do not claim such efficiency. Instead, we
present techniques in the proceeding sections to work around the problem of splitting the L part
modulo the K ideals in the factorization of q. Our methods are particularly efficient in the case
where q splits completely in L, but can be generalized to arbitrary splitting at only a small cost.
D. Fast Cryptography When q Splits Completely in L
We consider an explicit method for implementing fast cryptography in the special case where
the ideal 〈q〉 splits completely in OL. By construction, 〈q〉 =
∏
i qi in OK , so in this case we
split 〈q〉 = ∏i,j qi,j in OL, where the prime OK-ideals have prime decomposition in OL denoted
qiOL =
∏d
j=1 qi,j .
We recall some facts about the extension OLq of OKq. It is clear that the extension is cyclic
of degree d, with Galois group generated by θ. By the CRT,
OKq ∼=
∏
i
OK/qi ∼= Fqn
OLq ∼=
∏
i,j
OL/qi,j ∼= Fqnd
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where operations on the finite field products are applied coordinatewise. We represent the CRT
decomposition ofOLq as (Fqd)n, where each copy of Fqd corresponds to the extension
∏
j OL/qi,j
of OK/qi. In the finite field representation of
∏
j OL/qi,j , the elements of OK/qi embed as
elements of Fqd with the same entry in each coordinate, e.g. (x, x, . . . , x), corresponding to
scalars over (Fq)d, which can be seen from the following argument: for k ∈ OK , k = x mod qi
implies k − x ∈ qi. Then it follows that k − x ∈ qi,j and thus k = x mod qi,j for each j.
Furthermore there is a simple, explicit, description of the action of θ in this representation: since
θ cyclically shifts the ideals in the factorization of qi, one can order each copy of Fqd so that
the action of θ on (Fqd)n is a cyclical shift of the coordinates of each of the n copies of Fqd
concurrently. We exhibit this with a trivial example: set d = 3, n = 2. Then the action of θ on
(Fq3)2 is
θ(a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3) = (a3, a1, a2, b3, b1, b2).
A valid OK/qi basis for OL/qiOL of size d is e1, . . . , ed, where ei = (0, . . . , 1, . . . 0) denotes
the ith element of the standard basis of dimension d. Furthermore, this basis is orthonormal in
the sense that ei · ej = ei for i = j and 0 otherwise and cyclic10 in the sense that θ(ei) = ei+1
(e.g. normal), since the Galois group 〈θ〉 of L over K permutes the factors qi,j of qiOL for
each i. Because the CRT splits OLq into a direct product within which operations are computed
coordinatewise, we can extend this to a basis of OLq over OKq in the finite field representation
by concatenating n copies of this basis together, denoting by eni the vector of dimension nd
(ei, ei, . . . , ei). This basis is still cyclic, with θ operating independently on each of the n copies
of Fqd and hence the n copies of ei. Concatenating the bases in this way also preserves the
orthonormal property.
Denote the above basis by `1, . . . , `d. Recall that the CRT-like decomposition Lemma 12 splits
each u coordinate, an element of OLq, into its mod qiOL parts. However, we already know the
mod qiOL parts of each `j by construction. So, if we store elements of OLq as ` =
∑d
j=1 `jkj
for kj ∈ OKq we can split ` into its OL/qiOL components in time O(d · n log n) as long as
the kj elements are stored in the polynomial representation of OKq. Consequentially, we can
perform the CRT style decomposition of an element in Λq whose u coordinates are stored in
this manner in time O(d2 · n log n) = O(N log(N/d2)).
Now we see a way to achieve fast multiplication in Λq. We are required to perform the CRT
in each of the d u coordinates, after which we can plug the rings Ri into the fast multiplication
algorithm of [13]. Since the CRT is an isomorphism and we know the image of `i under the CRT,
this reduces to d copies of the CRT in OK , each with complexity O(dn log n), and therefore a
total multiplication complexity of O(N log(N/d2))+O(Ndω−2). However, this algorithm comes
with complications associated with the chosen representation of elements of OLq, which we
handle in the next section.
10As long as we choose the ordering in the right way.
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1) Handling Elements in the Representation: To use the above multiplication algorithms in
the scheme of Section V-B we need to be able to store the elements compactly and sample the
elements efficiently. Storing elements in this form turns out to be straightforward: each OLq
element requires storing d elements of OKq. An element of Λq is d elements of OLq, so in total
we store d2 elements of OKq, corresponding to one element of dimension N = nd2, which is
equivalent to storing d elements of dimension nd.
We now discuss how to efficiently sample elements of Λq according to an appropriate error
distribution. Recall from the security reduction of Section III that the error distributions we
recommend in practice are spherical or elliptical Gaussians in the coordinates of the embedding
σA. We sample using the following result.
Theorem 8. Let L/K be a tower of number fields with [K : Q] = n and [L : K] = d where
K is a prime-power cyclotomic field. Let q ≥ 2 be a prime modulus which splits completely in
OL and let `1, . . . , `d be the cyclic basis of OLq over OKq satisfying `i · `j = `i if i = j and 0
otherwise. Then, the distribution on OLq obtained by sampling k1, . . . , kd independently from a
discrete Gaussian over OKq in the polynomial representation and outputting ` =
∑
i `iki is a
discrete Gaussian over OLq in the `2 norm over LR.
Proof. Recall that in the case where K is a prime power cyclotomic the power basis is a rotation
and a scaling of the canonical basis (see e.g. [46]), so a discrete Gaussian in the polynomial
representation corresponds to a discrete Gaussian in the canonical basis as well. Order the
canonical embedding of OL such that elements of OK embed as vectors of n blocks of length
d that are the same in each block, e.g.
k1 = (k1,1, k1,1 . . . , k1,1, k1,2, . . . , k1,n),
where each entry ki,j of ki appears d times. Since the `i form a cyclic basis, in each d-block the
entries of `i+1 are just a cyclic shift of those of `i 11. For a fixed choice of basis the distribution
in each d-block of ` is independent, because the ki,j are sampled independently from a spherical
Gaussian. So we can consider one d block of ` at a time, and write the d-block of `1 as a1, . . . , ad.
Since multiplication in the canonical embedding is coordinatewise and the `i form a cyclic basis,
the first block of ` can be written as
a1 a2 . . . ad
ad a1 . . . ad−1
...
... . . .
...
a2 a3 . . . a1
 ·

k1,1
k2,1
...
kd,1
 .
Call the left matrix A and the right vector k. k is a Gaussian of parameter r, so Ak has has
a Gaussian distribution with covariance matrix r · AA† by e.g. [9, Lemma 2.5], and if this
is diagonal and constant on the lead diagonal then we are done. Due to the structure of the
11Again assuming a sensible ordering.
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canonical embedding and how we picked our basis in the OL/〈q〉 representation, we have that
ai = θ
i(a1), and that for i 6= j θi(a1) ·θj(a1) = 0 mod q. It follows that the off-diagonal entries
of AA† are 0 (since product being 0 is preserved under representations) and the diagonal entries
are
∑d
i=1 |ai|2, where | · | denotes the absolute value. Hence, the first d-block of ` is a spherical
Gaussian distribution, and since this analysis holds for any block it follows that each block of
` is a spherical Gaussian. One also needs to show that the Gaussian distribution has the same
variance in each block, but this follows from the fact that the K-embeddings permute the mod
qi values and fix the `2 norm of KR. Explicitly, by construction each K embedding modulo 〈q〉
can be extended ‘identically’ onto OL mod 〈q〉 in a way that fixes each `i, so they must have
the same set of values in each block (this would not be the case if we considered their norm in
a global sense, and the restriction modulo q is strictly necessary).
Note that the statement does not define the resulting parameter of the Gaussian outputting `,
but the proof allows one to compute this: say each ki was chosen from a discrete Gaussian of
parameter r. Then each element of ` has parameter
√∑
i |ai|2 ·r. Computing
√∑
i |ai|2 is a one
time cost for a fixed choice of `1, . . . , `d, so one can sample the required Gaussian over OLq of
parameter r′ by sampling from the discrete Gaussian over OKq of parameter r = r′/
√∑
i |ai|2.
Finally, to sample elements of Λq we merely sample each u coordinate independently according
to the above technique. If we wanted to use this method in the cryptosystem of Section V-B to
attain efficient operations then we would sample and store all elements using this representation
over the cyclic basis `1, . . . `d.
Unfortunately, we are unable to generalize this theorem to the case where qi remains prime,
or even intermediate cases. In this case, there exist cyclic bases of OL/qiOL over OK/qi, but
since OL/qiOL is a finite field and thus has no zero-divisors the cyclic bases are not orthogonal.
Consequentially, the matrix A does not in general give a diagonal AAT and thus the distribution
of Ak has several potentially large covariance terms. If one were able to tolerate the covariance,
the method can be extended in this case. It is also possible that a cyclic basis satisfying the
condition that AAT is diagonal may exist for certain choices of field, but we were not able to
find such a family of fields. We note that this question can be asked as a more generic question
about finite fields: let F = Fqd be a finite field with d > 1 and let θ denote the Frobenius
automorphism of F . Does there exist a cyclic basis b1, . . . , bd with bj = θj(b1) for F over Fq
satisfying
d−1∑
i=0
θi(b1 · θj−k(b1)) = 0
for all j 6= k less than d? Here j and k correspond to j, kth entry of AAT . We were unable to
come up with a basis satisfying this condition, but neither can we show that no such basis exists.
Example 4. We exhibit an example of the basis `1, `2 in the simplest setting, that of a degree
2 extension of Q. Let L = Q(i), with ring of integers OL = Z[i], and consider the ideal 〈5〉 of
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OL. 5 factorizes in OL as 5 = (2 + i)(2 − i), and it is clear that 〈5〉 = 〈2 + i〉 · 〈2 − i〉 is a
decomposition into a product of prime ideals.
Using the notation q1 := 〈2+ i〉, q2 := 〈2− i〉, it is easy to check that 2+ i = −1 mod q2 and
thus −(2 + i) = −2− i is a valid choice for `1. Similarly, −(2− i) = −2 + i is an appropriate
choice for `2. Correspondingly, the distribution obtained by sampling k1, k2 ← Dr, the discrete
Gaussian of parameter r over Z5, and outputting k1 ·(−2+i)+k2 ·(−2−i) is a discrete Gaussian
over OL mod 〈5〉. Furthermore, to multiply two elements k = k1`1 + k2`2 and g = g1`1 + g2`2
modulo 5 one outputs kg = (k1g1 mod 5) · `1 + (k2g2 mod 5) · `2, at a cost of two operations
in Z5, and performing the OL mod 5 CRT on each u coordinate of an element of the resulting
natural order Λ5 can be done by merely reading off the d2 = 4 values of ki and no additional
computation.
Furthermore, this is an example where the techniques of our next section may be advantageous.
We will generalize the multiplication and CRT technique so that one is free to use any basis
of OL over Z, for example the basis {1, i}. In this basis it is particularly easy to sample a
discrete Gaussian in the polynomial representation of OL mod 〈5〉 ∼= Z5[x]x2+1 , but the resulting
multiplication operation and CRT decomposition is not coordinatewise in the basis and so a small
amount of efficiency is lost at a gain in parameter of the Gaussian. Specifically, to compute the
CRT on an element k = k1 + k2 · i, one has to precompute12 the values i = −2 mod q1, i = 2
mod q2 and output
(k1 − 2k2 mod q1, 2k2 mod q2),
which requires additional operations over Z5.
E. Generalizing to non-Split q and Arbitrary Bases
In order to construct the cyclic, orthonormal, basis of Theorem 8, the previous section requires
that q be completely split in both K and L. However, it is possible to drop the splitting
condition in L and obtain fast multiplication algorithms in the general case at only a small
loss of efficiency. We demonstrate the technique in this section and then briefly describe cases
where a general algorithm may be superior to the one requiring that q splits by discussing
alternatives to Theorem 8.
Observe that, regardless of the prime ideal decomposition of each qiOL, under the CRT
decomposition the quotient ring OL/qiOL is a vector space of dimension d over Fq ∼= OK/qi.
Consequentially, an arbitrary OKq basis `1, . . . , `d of OLq can be decomposed into n bases
`j = (`1,j, . . . , `n,j) so that each collection `i,1, . . . , `i,d of qiOL parts is a vector space basis of
dimension d over OK/qi. Indeed, in the split case we constructed each `i in this manner. Armed
with this knowledge, we adapt the multiplication algorithm as follows.
Choose an arbitrary integral OK-basis `1, . . . , `d of OL. As a precomputation phase, compute
and store the images `j mod qiOL for each i and j. The CRT-like decomposition of Lemma 12
12Note that precomputing the image of 1 is trivial.
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splits each of the u coordinates of an element of Λq, an element of OLq, into its mod qiOL
parts. Once again, we suggest an algorithm where elements of OLq are stored in the form
` =
∑d
j=1 `jkj for kj ∈ OKq, e.g. on elements stored as K-combinations of this basis. We split
` ∈ OLq into its OL/qi components in time O(d · n log n), since
d∑
j=1
`jkj mod qiOL =
d∑
j=1
(`j mod qiOL) · (kj mod qiOL),
where each kj mod qi can be computed in time O(n log n) by the K-CRT and each `j mod qi
mod OL was computed in the precomputation phase. Consequentially, we can perform the CRT
style decomposition of an element in Λq whose u coordinates are all stored in this manner in
time O(d2 · n log n), since we must split d2 elements of OK . This decomposing complexity is
the same as in the previous case where q splits completely. Following this, each ring Ri can be
plugged in to the algorithm of [13] to compute the multiplication in time O(Ndω−2). However,
since the `i do not correspond to a standard orthonormal basis we incur an extra cost when
reversing this transformation. Namely, each of the u coordinates of each ring Ri is output by
the algorithm of [13] as an element ` ∈ OL mod qiOL expressed in an arbitrary normal basis.
Before reversing the decomposition we must allow for the complexity of expressing each element
of the output in the bases obtained by the images of `1, . . . , `d mod qiOL, as this basis was not
necessarily normal. Since OL mod qiOL is a vector space of dimension d over Fq this can be
done via a precomputed change of basis matrix over Fq in time O(dω), and since there are n rings
with d coordinates each the complexity of computing this on every coordinate is O(ndω+1). The
resulting multiplication algorithm has total complexity O(N log(N/d2))+O(Ndω−1). While this
represents only a minor asymptotic loss, especially since we expect the first term to dominate the
complexity, it is likely in practice that the extra step required to recover the basis representation
would cause a tangible slowdown.
An unfortunate issue with this technique is that by replacing the orthonormal basis with an
arbitrary basis we have lost Theorem 8 and thus the efficient method for sampling a discrete
Gaussian in the representation ` =
∑
j `jkj . However, this generalization allows for the use of
an arbitrary basis `1, . . . , `d, unlike in the split case in which we chose a specific basis. Since we
require that elements of Λq are input into the algorithm with u coordinates in the form
∑
j `jkj
this algorithm can be combined with the cryptosystem of Section V-B in the case where there is
a basis g1, . . . , gd of OLq over OKq in which one can compute the representation ` =
∑
j gjkj
particularly efficiently. This is because one can just sample ` from the usual Gaussian distribution
over the polynomial basis of OLq, compute its representation as ` =
∑
j gjkj , and then apply
the multiplication algorithm in this form. More generally, the flexible choice of basis allows
for both non-split q and for a user to choose their favourite OL basis properties, such as a
normal basis or a basis consisting of small elements. We remark that it is likely possible to
construct a pair of fields L/K that allow for a basis `1, . . . , `d permitting a fast algorithm
transforming from the polynomial representation of OL to the representation
∑
i `iki with each
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ki in polynomial representation, which would allow one to bypass the complications of sampling
Gaussian distributions by just sampling in OL directly.
F. Generalizing to Other Centers
In the exposition of the previous section we required that q splits completely in the center K.
This corresponds to the requirement in the ring and module cases that q splits completely in the
field K, which allows the use of the NTT to compute multiplications over a direct product of
finite fields. However, there has been recent progress in loosening this requirement for the NTT
and allowing the modulus q to be 1 mod n rather than 1 mod m, where as usual K is the mth
cyclotomic field of degree n. For example, in the second round specification of KYBER [5] q
is set as 3329 and n = 256, yet they still support efficient NTT based multiplication. In such
cases, q is ‘well’ split but not completely split, and the fast NTT operations use the method of
[42], where q splits into some product of prime ideals qi whose norms can be small powers of
q.
We observe that our methods can be partially generalized to this case in the following manner.
Say 〈q〉 = ∏i qi is a decomposition into prime ideals in OK and there exists an efficient algorithm
for fast multiplication in OKq. We can replace our condition that q splits completely in OL with
the condition that each ideal qi in the OK-factorization of q splits completely into a product of
d prime ideals qiOL =
∏d
j=1 qi,j in OL of the same norm. Then, we can replicate the method
of Section G-D to find a cyclic, orthonormal basis e1, . . . , ed of OL/qiOL over OK/qi and
concatenate together the bases for each i to make the cyclic, orthonormal, basis `1, . . . , `d of
OLq over OKq. Since the basis is orthonormal, if ` =
∑
i `iki and g =
∑
i `igi with each
ki, gi ∈ OKq, then
` · g =
d∑
i=1
`i(gi · ki).
Since the basis is cyclic,
θ(`) =
∑
i
θ(`i)ki
=
∑
i
`iki−1
where we define k0 := kd.
Now we are able to use existing fast multiplication algorithms in OKq to compute operations
in OLq by expressing elements in this basis. Represent each x =
∑d−1
i=0 u
ixi ∈ Λq by expressing
each xi ∈ OLq in the `j basis. Then, to multiply x and y in Λq one only has to compute
multiplications in OKq, since the operations required are just computing the non-commutative
relation `u = uθ(`), which merely permutes the `i using θ, and computing multiplication and
addition, which can be done coordinatewise in the orthonormal `i basis. Each L multiplication
requires d multiplications in K, and each u coordinate of Λ requires d multiplications in L.
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Consequentially, naive multiplication in Λq takes d3 instances of the efficient OKq-multiplication
algorithm we have access to. For specific K-multiplication algorithms it is likely that this process
can be streamlined; the intention of this section is merely to demonstrate that one can build
efficient Λq operations from more general efficient operations over the center in the same manner
that the techniques of Section G-D used the CRT method.
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